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ABSTRACT

Health data uses are on the rise. Increasingly more often, data are
used for a variety of operational, diagnostic, and technical uses, as in
the Internet of Health Things. Never has quality data been more
necessary: large data stores now power the most advanced artificial
intelligence applications, applications that may enable early diagnosis
of chronic diseases and enable personalized medical treatment. These
data, both personally identifiable and de-identified, have the potential
to dramatically improve the quality, effectiveness, and safety of
artificial intelligence.
Existing privacy laws do not 1) effectively protect the privacy
interests of individuals and 2) provide the flexibility needed to support
artificial intelligence applications. This paper identifies some of the
key challenges with existing privacy laws, including the
ineffectiveness of de-identification and data minimization protocols in
practice and issues with notice and consent as they apply to artificial
intelligence applications, then proposes an alternative privacy model.
This model specifically rejects a notice and consent model in favor of
legitimate interest analysis. This approach introduces a more
restrictive application of health privacy law while adopting a flexible,
interest-balancing approach to permit additional data uses that
primarily benefit individuals and communities.

128

HODS. J. HEALTH L. & POLY

INTRODUCTION

Health data uses are increasing, and data are becoming even more
essential in health applications. Health data elements are unlike other
types of consumer data because they can be used for new uses: quality
and efficiency in care, improvements in diagnostic processes, or crossproduct treatment and system efficacy. Artificial intelligence (Al) has
the potential to revolutionize healthcare through data use. But how do
organizations collect the vast data volume needed to power Al when
privacy law could impede data flow?
Much has been written on the degree to which algorithmic
decision-making should be more transparent to facilitate fairness and
non-discrimination goals.1 Others, including this Author, have
focused more generally on the inadequacies of the U.S. privacy system
for healthcare technologies. 2 Scholars have highlighted the likelihood
of AI-caused injuries, including who or what should be held legally
accountable for such injuries, without discussing the natural tension
between safety and privacy rights: increased access to personal

1 See generally Mason Marks, Algorithmic DisabilityDiscrimination,in DISABILITY, HEALTH, LAW,
AND BioETHncs (2020) (1. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2020) (identifying
key risks to individuals with disabilities by using Al to treat people with disabilities
differently, such as exploiting them); Andrew Selbst & Salon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of

Explainable Machines, 87 FORD. L. REV. 1085, 1118 (2018) (highlighting the 'inherent good'
associated with explainability to understand decisions that impact individual options); Anya
Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discriminationin the Age ofArtificial Intelligence and Big Data,
105 IOWA L. REV. 1257(2020) (describing the potential for discrimination even when data that
could lead to discrimination are not directly collected by an organization); Frank Pasquale,

Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an
Algorithmic Society, 78 OH-o ST. L. J. 1243, 1247 (2017) (explaining how algorithms can lead to
unfairness and discrimination issues, such as 'algorithmic nuisance'); Scott R. Peppet,
Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination,Privacy, Security,
and Consent, 93 TEx. L. REV. 85, 140-46 (2014) (introducing IoT's key areas of concern);
Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and
Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DEN. L. REV. 87, 97-98 (2018) (analyzing the
potential for discrimination associated with big data feeding Al algorithmic decision-

making).
&

2 See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Will the Internet of Things Transform Healthcare?,19 VAND. J. ENT.
TECH. L. 327, 338-39 (2016) (positing that most mobile and software providers will not be
subject to HIIPAA); Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24
HEALTH MATRIX 65, 80 (2014) (noting HIPAA's broad exceptions to specific privacy
obligations, for example 'laundered, 'or inferential, health data); Charlotte A. Tschider,
Enhancing Cybersecurityfor the DigitalHealth Marketplace, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 1, 10, 16, 29
(2017) (concluding that many digital health devices will only be subject to general FTC
oversight).
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information often results in safer and more efficacious Al products. 3
Each of these investigations, while critically important, does not
directly examine this tension or recommend a specific course of action
for balancing privacy and safety interests in an effective way.4 Data use
for purposes of improving products or offering new products that
benefit public health may indeed be justification for data use beyond
originally disclosed purposes, such as what has been described in a
privacy notice or notice of privacy practices.
Healthcare privacy is an essential part of developing trust in
healthcare treatment and facilitating effective insurance transactions.
Without effective privacy commitments in healthcare, patients may
not be willing to offer accurate information to enable effective
diagnosis and treatment or may not seek health treatment at all.5
Indeed, individually identifiable health data elements are especially
sensitive because they are a digital extension of a person's physical and
mental body and bodily function, or datafication.6 Individually

3 See generally W. Nicholson Price, Medical Malpractice and Black-box Medicine, BIG DATA,
HEALTH LAW, AND BIoE-Tcs (2018) (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018)
(describing potential malpractice suits related to the use of AL in medicine); see Andrew D.
Selbst, Negligence and Al's Human Uses, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1315,1329 (2020); see Rebecca Crootof,

Internet of Torts, 69 DUKE L.

J.

583, 607 (2019) (describing IoT system liability in health

applications, many of which will increasingly be connected to Al systems); W. Nicholson

Price et al., Potential Liability for Physicians Using Artificial Intelligence, 322 JAMA 1765 (Oct.
2019); Pasquale, supra note 1, at 1247.

4 Ryan Calo does offer some perspective related to safety and privacy, specifically the "data
parity problem," wherein data will be consumed in large volume by AL, and these data must
be supplied from somewhere, likely data sources that have substantially more power and
reach than the individuals about whom data are collected. See Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence

Policy:A Primerand Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIs 399,424 (2017). Mason Marks similarly addresses
both safety and privacy as separate considerations in the context of suicide prevention. Mason
Marks, Artificial Intelligence Based Suicide Prevention, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 98, 111(2019).
Although tremendously important in terms of the issues that apply to Al-enabled robotics
and AL suicide prevention, respectively, Calo and Marks do not squarely address collision of
safety and privacy where competing interests may cut in favor of privacy on one hand or
safety on the other.

5

W. Nicholson Price, II & 1. Glenn Cohen, Privacyin the Age of Medical Big Data, 25 NAT. MED.
37 (2019) (noting the importance of trust in any big data transactions, both from the
perspectives of the patient and the physician).

6 Indeed, datafication as it pertains to patients is intended to ultimately benefit the patient. The
degree of such a benefit, however, is often up for debate. See Kristen Ostherr, Privacy, Data
Mining, and Data Profiling in Online Patient Narratives, 4 CATALYST: FEMINMSM, THEORY,
(2018),
2-5
1,
TECHNOSCI.
https://catalystjournal.org/ index.php/catalyst/article/view/29628/html.
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identifiable health data are also at increased risk of misuse,
unauthorized disclosure, and use for discriminatory purposes. 7
Data, however, are also crucial to modern healthcare. Data are
used not only for directly providing healthcare but also for measuring
quality in such transactions, advancing efficiency goals, and reducing
costs.8 Data are used for improving product functionality and for
creating new AI-enabled products. Although for certain types of uses,
data need not be highly sensitive or even individually identifiable, Al
systems will likely use at least some individually identifiable data. 9 The
necessity of such data complicates privacy compliance: usually the
designers of Al systems do not know which data will be useful at the
time of collection. 10 Further, the black-box nature of Al, either through
dynamic inscrutability or trade secrecy, makes it nearly impossible to
disclose the extent to which data are actually used."

7 See Marks, supra note 1, at 18; Tschider, supra note 1, at 122-23; Charlotte Tschider & Krista

Kennedy, Data Discrimination: The International Regulatory Impasse of AI-Enabled Medical
Wearables, in LEGAL, SOC. & ETHICAL PERSP. ON HEALTH & TECH. (Motahareh Fathisalout
Bollon & Anna Berti Suman eds., USMB 2020) (describing key issues related to reliance of
audiology patients on doctors and audiologists, including the fact that data use and
associated data ecosystems are generally opaque to principal health workers, let alone
patients); see Price & Cohen, supra note 5, at 37 (separating potential risk into deontological
and consequentialist concerns, wherein consequentialist concerns include tangible negative
consequences).

8 See generally Alessandro Capone et al., Health Data Entanglement and Artificial IntelligenceBased Analysis: A Brand New Methodology to Improve the Effectiveness of HealthcareServices, 167
CLIN. TER. 102(2016) (describing the value of health data for quality and operations purposes).

9 Guy Pearce, Beware the Privacy Violations in Artificial Intelligence Applications, ISACA Now
BLOG (May 28, 2021), https://www.isaca.org/resources/news-and-trends/isaca-nowblog/2021/beware-the-privacy-violations-in-artificial-intelligence-applications.
10 See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRTvACY RULE 1526-27
(2013),
regulations/index.html.

https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-

11 Black-box medicine is medicine conducted through opaque, automated methods. For
example, Al diagnostic tools could diagnose cancer with a 90% probability from
mammogram images without explaining how that diagnosis was made. W. Nicholson Price,

Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419,421 (2015) (introducing the concept of black-box
medicine); W. Nicholson Price, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421,423 (2017)
&

(identifying approached to regulate opaque medical Al); see Roger Allan Ford & W.
Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016) (identifying models for reviewing medical Al, including issues related
to privacy in disclosure of data associated with medical Al); Charlotte Tschider, Beyond the
Black Box, 98 DENV. L. REV. 683 (2020) (describing Al's dynamic inscrutability and advocating
for alternative models to determine AI quality).
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In this paper, I directly examine this intersection of data use
interests and privacy interests and recommend two example models
that the U.S. Department of Health and Humans Services (HHS) and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could use to better analyze
whether data use is "necessary." I also recommend how both agencies
might better govern secondary data use when such use has a
"substantial public benefit," specifically through an interest-balancing
approach. These two models illustrate how interest-balancing could
work within the current HIPAA and FTC Fair Information Practices
models, or what features a new policy model could have to balance
these interests.
Part I introduces Al technology in healthcare, offering case studies
of Al applications. Part II describes the history and function of health
privacy regulation, introducing how the U.S. model was not designed
for Al use with big data. Part III explores the inconsistent and
frequently diverging aims of healthcare privacy and Al safety and
reliability, specifically how responsible Al development requires an
evolution of thought regarding healthcare privacy. In Part IV, I
recommend an approach for balancing the interests of data use while
simultaneously toughening privacy requirements in HHS, FTC, and
state law models. Such data interest approaches should balance
interests in favor of patient and public benefit rather than promoting
opaque organizational data benefits.

I. AI AND BIG DATA APPLICATIONS
Popular television shows and movies on Al, such as the
Westworld HBO TV series and the 2014 film Ex Machina, illustrate the
popular association between Al and sentience. 12 Yet, the most common
Al technology involves algorithms designed based on data stored in a
database, and recommending decisions, commonly called machine

12 Denise Chow et al., Westworld 'ScienceAdvisor Shares His Vision of Robots and the Future of Al,
NBC NEWS (2018), https://woww.nbcnews.com/mach/science/westworld-science-adviser-shares-hisvision-robots-future-ai-ncna883321;Alex Garland, Alex Garland of 'Ex Machina Talks About

Artificial Intelligence, THE N.Y. TiMEs (Apr. 22, 2015); Bobby Azarian, The Myth of Sentient
2016),
1,
(June
TODAY
PSYCHOLOGY
Machines,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/mind-in-the-machine/201606/the-mythsentient-machines.
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learning.13 Machine learning is the most commonly used Al approach
in healthcare today, and it can be used for any number of tasks from
task automation to analytics.14
The foundation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is data.1 5 From
relatively simple, nonlinear algorithms, to supervised or unsupervised
machine learning and deep learning through advanced neural
networks, data are used to create algorithms that render a decisional
result.16 Machine learning applications use exceptionally large
volumes of data, which are analyzed by a machine learning utility to
determine interrelationships between these data.1 7 As data change,
frequently so does the algorithm.
The remarkable ability of Al to "self-learn" through reassessing
big data relationships then updating its algorithms is what separates
Al from traditional data science and human-designed algorithms. The
most complex problems typically require the most complex AI
solutions. And, the more complex the Al system and algorithm, the
more important data volume and data quality become.18
A. Artificial Intelligence's Big Data Dependency
Although the idea of a digital computer began with Charles
Babbage's idea for a "digital engine," an entirely mechanical machine,
the concept was not realized until Alan Turing proposed the concept
of a "universal computer."1 9 The universal computer could be adapted
for multiple purposes, with storage, an operating executive unit to
direct core behavior, and controls or rules that govern behavior. 20
13 Bernard Marr, What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning?,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/06/what-isthe-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/#101fde3b2742.

14 Tirthajyoti Sarkar, AI and Machine Learningfor Healthcare, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Apr. 24, 2020),
https:/ / towardsdatascience.com/ai-and-machine-learning-for-healthcare-7a7fb3acb67.
15 Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: The Three

Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO L. J.1217,1221 (2017).
16 Jason Brownlee, How Much Training Data is Required for Machine Learning? MACHTNE
LEARNING MASTERY (July 24, 2017), https://machinelearningmastery.com/much-trainingdata-required-machine-learning/; see Tschider, supra note 11, at 690.

17 See Tschider, supra note 11, at 690-92.
18 For a more comprehensive explanation of Al type and function, see id.

19 Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433, 439 (1950).
20 Id. at 437.
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Turing described a universal computer equipped with an infinite data
store, which could be called an "infinitive capacity computer." 21
The universal computer, or the Universal Turing Machine,
anticipated continuous learning by permitting controls or rules to be
updated like data, using a meta-logical interpreter. 22 This continuous
learning capacity is key for Al in differentiating between humandesigned algorithms and self-executing AI. 23 These systems leverage
substantial computing power, as Turing suggested, 24 coupled with big
data stores, or databases designed for broad data collection and use. 25
In short, modern Al is exactly as it was originally envisioned by
Turing: AI's success or failure is directly connected to the quality and
volume of data used to train Al algorithms or improve its accuracy
over time. 26

Powerful computers excel at evaluating large volumes of data to
identify referential relationships. For example, an Al data set including
radiological images may include thousands, if not more, images. 27
Each image carries with it data points that must be analyzed in
relationship to others, and an Al algorithm may analyze imaging data
points as well as other inputs, such as specific symptoms or lab
results. 28 For example, a typical diagnostic process for colon cancer
would involve analyzing lab tests for blood in a patient's stool, blood
tests indicating anemia, colonoscopy results, and images. However,
an Al diagnostic test could potentially diagnose colon cancer
21 Id. at 438-39.
22 Id. at 440.
23 Id. at 439; Ben Lorica, Why Continuous Learning is Key to Al, O'REILLY (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.oreilly.com/radar/why-continuous-learning-is-key-to-ai/.
24 Id. at 445.
25 Big data are described in terms of volume, velocity, and variety, designed specifically for
high availability use along with accommodating a diversity and great number of data
elements. Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learningand Data Protection,INFO. COMM'R'S

OFF. 1, 6-7.
26 Willem Sundblad, Data Is the Foundationfor Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, FORBES

(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/willemsundbladeurope/2018/10/18/datais-the-foundation-for-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/.
27 Ronald Summers & Andrew Murphy et al., Imaging Data Sets (Artificial Intelligence),
RADIOPAEDIA (last visited Apr. 30, 2021), https://radiopaedia.org/articles/imaging-datasets-artificial-intelligence.
28 D. Douglas Miller & Eric W. Brown, How Cognitive Machines Can Augment Medical Imaging,

212 AJR 9,10-11 (an. 2019), https://www.ajronline.org/doi/pdf/10.2214/AJR.18.19914.
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probability before symptoms manifest by using alternative patient
data. It may also be able to analyze images more effectively, especially
for "borderline" cases.
Organizations do not only use data to create algorithms; data are
needed both in continuous supply and long-term for purposes of
algorithmic learning or tuning. 29 Further, the system-generated
algorithm is continuously adapting as new data are generated and
added, modifying the algorithm. 30 See Figure 1, which describes when
in an AI's lifecycle data are used.
Figure 1: AI Data Lifecycle 3 l

Algorithmic
Clinical Testing
&

Algorithmic
Training

Improvement

and Parallel Learning

29 Unsupervised machine learning and optimally functioning neural networks become more
effective over time as they learn. To avoid potential issues related to safety and efficacy, some
medical devices are "locking" algorithms after they have been trained on clinical data, to
avoid resubmission for U.S. Food & Drug Administration review processes. However, Al's
potential is tied to self-learning, whether self-learning on a separate system for purposes of
later FDA resubmission as a "material change," or an Al that continuously changes in its live
version.
30 John Schreifer, Six Questions About Machine Learning and Al for Warehouse Management,
LUCAS (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.lucasware.com/six-questions-about-machinelearning-for-warehouse-management/.

31 See, e.g., Pratik Shah et al., ArtificialIntelligence and Machine Learningin ClinicalDevelopment: a
Translational Perspective, NPJ DIGrrAL MED. 1, 2-3 (describing use of machine learning in
clinical and real-world applications after initial algorithmic development, especially for startups and to meet FDA requirements). Artificial intelligence in healthcare is still reviewed using
existing U.S. Food & Drug Administration processes, which require the submission of
research data and outcomes with an Investigational Device Exception to perform clinical
research. After clinical research has concluded, the device must be submitted for approval in
a Pre-Market Approval, 510(k), or De Novo classification process. After this time, whether or
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Algorithmic training uses data for purposes of developing the AI
algorithm. In this stage, data are stored in a big data set, upon which
an algorithm runs for a predetermined period of time 3 2 After an
algorithm has undergone initial testing, if it is intended to be used for
patients, it may be tested in clinical testing protocol, wherein it will be
tested for safety and efficacy.3 3 After the algorithm is approved, it
either may be configured to adapt on the fly, dynamically, where data
are continuously added to the big data set to improve the algorithm or
may collect data and create a shadow algorithm to be released a later
time.34 Regardless of the model used, data are essential to every part
of the Al algorithmic lifecycle, from creation to improvement.
B. AI Safety and Discrimination Concerns
Neural-networked Al systems, which are responsible for the most
complex of diagnostic medical tasks, have the ability to intake these
data across thousands of patients, apply advanced inferences and
weightings across data points, and predict certain outcomes, such as
whether an individual likely has breast cancer.3 5 The data set needs to
be very robust because comprehensive analytics depend on big data,
including for use in AI. 36
not an AI-enabled medical device is updated (and dynanically "learning") is based on
whether the AL algorithms are locked upon submission to the FDA. See Artificial Intelligence
andMachine Learning in Software as a Medical Device. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 12, 2021),
https:/ /www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificialintelligence-and-machine-learning-software-medical-device; see also Charlotte A. Tschider,

Medical Device Artificial Intelligence: The New Tort Frontier, 46 BYU L. REv. 1551, 1572 (2021).
32 Adrian Yijie Xu, How to Train Your Model: A Novice's Guide to Selecting the Correct Machine

Algorithm for Your Problem, GRADIENT CRESCENT (Mar. 6,
https:/ /medium.com/gradientcrescent/the-right-tool-for-the-job-a-novice-guide-to(describing
selecting-the-correct-machine-learning-algorithm-for-60613c7f7b0b
selection and running code on a data set).
Learning

2019),
model

33 See Tschider, supra note 31, at 1581.
34 Id. at 1572-73.
35 See Tschider, supra note 11, at 692-93; Farhad Malik, Neural Network Bias and Weights,
FFNTECHEXPLAINED (May 18, 2019),
networks-bias-and-weights-10b53e6285da;

https://medium.com/fintechexplained/neural-

Christoph I Lee & Joann G. Elmore, Artificial
Intelligence for Breast Cancer Imaging: The New Frontier?,111 J. NAT'L. CANCER INST. 875-76

(2019), doi: 10.1093/jnci/ djy223.
36 Wendy Netter Epstein & Charlotte Tschider, We Need to Do More with Hospitals 'Data, But

There Are Better Ways, HARV. L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR. BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (July 7, 2021),
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/07/hospital-data-big-tech/. The crucial
use of big data for AL application is described as dataessentialism.
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Data volume and quality have a significant effect on the reliability,
safety, and fairness of an Al system because the system encodes data
relationships and weightings in its algorithms. 37 Of course, the volume
and variety of data needed to make a system reliable and avoid these
issues is highly specific to a given system's chief goals?3 8 Similar to a
human mind that makes assumptions without enough data inputs
results in cognitive biases, 39 algorithms without sufficient data volume
or without quality data are more likely to make algorithmic
assumptions, 40 which may produce dangerous or discriminatory
results.41
Training data, which data scientists use to create and refine initial
AI algorithms, may begin from initial inferences based on data that
include discriminatory practices.4 2 By training Al on such data, the Al
itself may codify discrimination and perpetuate it through later
decisions, except with the guise of technical objectivity. 43 Even when
such data sets do not explicitly include sensitive individually
identifiable data elements, individuals may still experience

37 See Tschider, supra note 11, at 693.

38 Bernard Marn, Why Al Would Be Nothing Without Big Data, FORBES (June 9, 2017, 12:29 AM),
https:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/06/09/why-ai-would-be-nothingwithout-big-data/#1d7677c54f6d; Joshua New, Al Needs Better Data, Not Just More Data, CTR.
FOR DATA INNOVATION (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/03/ai-needsbetter-data-not-just-more-data/.
39 See Jessica Stillman, 6 Cognitive Biases That Are Messing Up Your Decision Making, INC. (Nov.

22, 2016), https://www.inc.com/jessica-stillman/6-cognitive-biases-that-are-messing-upyour-decision-making.html.
40 Matthew Stewart, The Limitations of Machine Learning, TOWARDS DATA SCL. (July 29, 2019),
https:/ /towardsdatascience.com/ the-limitations-of-machine-learning-a00ec3O4Oc6.
41 See Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and

Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DEN. L. REV. 87, 98-100 (2018).
42 Sandra Wachter & Brent Middelstadt, A Right to Reasonable

Inferences: Re-thinking

Data

Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and Al, 2019 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 494, 543-48 (2019)
(proposing a right to know and rectify inferences).
43 Douglas McNair & W. Nicholson Price,

11,

Health Care Al: Law, Regulation, and Policy, in

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE: THE HOPE, THE HYPE, THE PROMISE, THE PERIL

181,184 (Michael Matheny et al. eds., NAT'L. ACAD. MED 2019) [hereinafter, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE]. Paul Teich, Artificial Intelligence Can Reinforce Bias, Cloud
Giants Announce Tools for Al Fairness, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulteich/2018/09/24/artificial-intelligence-can-reinforcebias-cloud-giants-announce-tools-for-ai-fairness/#bd6835e9d21f.
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discrimination by proxy,44 simply because data fed to the algorithmic
is inaccurate or unfair. 45
Although the need for data to avoid issues related to safety,
efficacy, and unfairness may seem obvious, there are additional
nuances that strengthen the case for more, better, and varied data sets.
One significant issue in the diagnostic realm involves transferring
diagnostic and treatment Al between differentiated contextual
environments.

For Al systems, two of the most crucial choices an Al designer
must make are 1) the training data set and 2) the mechanisms for
immediate feedback and correction.4 6 If an Al system trains on data
from hospitals with a high degree of resources, such as the newest
technologies and the most highly trained practitioners, the model the
Al system creates will be oriented towards high-resource use and may
not be as effective as one trained on low-resource environments. 47 This
means that training data should be representative for the population
where the Al might be used,48 similar to how clinical trials for certain
populations often are the populations to whom certain drugs may be
marketed.
In different contextual environments and with highly
differentiated equipment, facilities, and patient populations, the
efficacy of an algorithm and its attendant recommended treatments
might be less.4 9 For example, an algorithm that has been developed
using data from patients with access to top hospitals and the best
specialists may not include data from socially or financially
44 See generally Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial

Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REv. 1257 (2020) (describing the likelihood of
discrimination when big data and highly powerful AL systems can result in discriminatory
application of decisions to protected groups).
45 Derek A. Haas et al., 3 Myths About Machine Learning in Health Care, HARV. Bus. REv. (Nov.
13, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/3-myths-about-machine-learning-in-health-care.

46 Challen et al., Artificial Intelligence, Bias and Clinical Safety, 28 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 238
(2018), available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjqs-2018-008370.
47 See W. Nicholson Price HI, Medical Al and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 65, 96-100

(2019).
48 Id. at 115.
49 Id. at 96-100 (describing in great detail the potential risks associated with applying a trained
algorithm within new and different contexts, and suggesting issues related to contextual
change could be avoided through collecting data representative of these contexts and
responsibly training algorithms based on these data).
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disadvantaged patients, many of which are highly vulnerable due to
certain risk factors or co-morbidities. 50
Treatment recommendation following diagnosis may also be
tuned to high-resourced facilities.5 1 This seems to suggest that
differentiated data collection requires more comprehensive and
contextual data collection to develop contextually extensible Al
algorithms. Moreover, contextual data collection is necessary to
address safety and efficacy concerns, as well as the potential for
unfairness through application of substandard Al to certain lowresourced communities or protected classes. 52
Al does not simply require data, but it requires that data are
available from a variety of data populations and collection contexts. 53
Data must be quality, well-organized, appropriately labeled, and
reliably sourced to ensure Al systems perform safely, efficaciously,
and fairly.54 If Al data scientists cannot collect or use good data, patients
will not reap the potential benefits Al has the potential to provide and
society will not see the economic benefits of Al investments.
C. Health Al Case Studies
The healthcare marketplace has transformed in recent years,
positioning itself for safer, more reliable, non-invasive, and costeffective solutions through artificial intelligence. Al healthcare,
therefore, has dominated Al investment-$4 billion in 2019,55

50

Id. at 96-97.

51

Id.

52 Michael Matheny et. al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare:Hope not Hype, Promise not Peril, in
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE 217-18.

53

Indeed, broad, representative data collection is at the center of data ethics commitments. See
Luciano Floridi & Mariarosaria Taddeo, What Is Data Ethics?, 374 PIHLO. TRANS. ROYAL SOC'Y
at:
available
3
(2016),
SCi.
1,
&
ENG.
PHYs.
A:
MATHEMATICAL,
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0360.

54

Paramita (Guha) Ghosh, Challenges of Quality Data in the Al Ecosystem, DATAVERSITY (Nov.
12, 2019), https://www.dataversity.net/challenges-of-data-quality-in-the-ai-ecosystem/

55 Heather

Landi, Investors Poured $4B
into Healthcare Al Startups in 2019,
FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Jan.
22,
2020,
5:55
PM),
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/ tech/investors-poured-4b-into-healthcare-ai-startups2019.
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positioned to reach $6.6 billion by 2021.56 In fact, after new revelations
of the value of low-touch and remote medical care during the COVID19 pandemic, the healthcare Al marketplace is anticipated to be valued
at $51.3 billion by 2027.57 If investment follows these market
predictions, some analysts have predicted Al will save $150 billion
annually, by 2026.58 Ultimately, AL may provide more efficient and
effective healthcare solutions, but it also could dramatically reduce
healthcare costs. That is, if these solutions are safe, effective, and fair.
Healthcare Al technologies include operational support,
diagnostics, and kinetics.5 9 The more advanced the category and
associated Al functions, the more dependent on data the algorithm
becomes. Except for self-driving cars and automated industrial
applications, such as electrical grid operation, some of the most
complex Al applications are in the healthcare sector, which means that
health data are essential ingredients for Al health applications.
Individually identifiable health data are increasingly used for a
variety of important purposes, and it is not always possible to render

56 AI

and Healthcare: A Giant Opportunity, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2019, 12:47 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-intelai/2019/02/11/ai-and-healthcare-a-giantopportunity/#3d308f284c68.

57

METICULOUS RESEARCH, HEALTHCARE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) MARKET WORTH $51.3
BILLION BY 2027 - EXCLUSIVE REPORT COVERING PRE AND POST COVID-19 MARKET ANALYSIS BY

METICULOUS

RESEARCH, CISION

PR

NEWSWIRE (Aug.

27,

2020,

9:07

AM),

https:/ /www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/healthcare-artificial-intelligence-ai-marketworth-51-3-billion-by-2027 - exclusive-report-covering-pre-and-post-covid-19-marketanalysis-by-meticulous-research-301119739.html.
58

Future Al Opportunities for Improving Care Delivery, Cost, and Efficacy, HEALTH IT
ANALYTICS (July 29, 2019), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/future-ai-opportunities-forimproving-care-delivery-cost-and-efficacy.

59 PHILIPS, USING Al TO MEET OPERATIONAL, CLICAL GOALS
https://www.philips.com/c-dam/b2bhc/master/seamless-care/Q1-

5-6

(Feb.

2018),

HIM/AI_Updated_02032018.pdf. Al-enabled medical devices that introduce some physical
functionality are "kinetic," in that they have a physical, rather than mental manifestation of
Al automation. For example, decisional systems that identify congestive heart failure function
differently than an artificial pancreas, which physically releases insulin to the body. See

Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the World,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2018); Nimri et al., Insulin Dose Optimization Using an Automated
Artificial Intelligence-BasedDecision Support System in Youths with Type

1 Diabetes, 26 NAT MED.

1380, 1380-81 (Sept. 2020), available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s4591-020-10457. Healthcare robots similarly occupy "kinetic" functionality based on Al, which may include
robotic-assisted surgery. INTEL, Robotics in Healthcare to Improve Patient Outcomes,
https:/ /www.intel.com/content/ www/us/en/healthcare-it/robotics-in-healthcare.html
(last accessed: July 28, 2021).
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such data non-identifiable yet retain its usefulness. The following cases
illustrate a variety of data uses that specifically demonstrate both a)
the range of uses for individually identifiable health data and b) the
necessity of such data to fulfill legitimate health goals.
1. Value-Based Healthcare
Value-based healthcare has been a central focus of healthcare
development for private insurers and government health plans. Under
the Health Information Technology for Clinical Health (HITECH) Act
of 2009, healthcare organizations had been directed to make health
data electronic, in the form of electronic medical records (eMR) or
electronic health records (eHR). 60 In 2010, with the passage of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that created
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), the United States
government has invested heavily in data development and exchange. 61
Most recently, in 2015, the Medicare Access and CHIP
Authorization Act consolidated a mix of quality and efficiency
reporting indicators to simplify evaluation of organization and
physician performance: Merit-Based Incentive Programs (MIPs) and
Alternative Payment Models (AMPs), both of which rely heavily on
62
submission of detailed patient encounter information.
Although typically AI is not discussed in relation to value-based
healthcare, automation Al is a natural extension of value-based
healthcare goals and is positioned to save as much as $71 billion
annually through virtual nursing assistants, administrative workflow
assistance, fraud detection, and dosage error reduction. 63 Connected
machines enabling remote monitoring could save an additional $14
billion per year. 64

60 42 U.S.C. § 300jj (2020).
61 Taylor Burke, Accountable Care Organizations, 126 PUS. HEALTH REPS. 875, 875-76 (2011).
62 Niam Yaraghi, MACRA Proposed Rule Creates More Problems Than It Solves, HEALTH AFFs.

12,
BLOG (Oct.
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2Ol6lOl2.057043/full/

2016),
(providing that

organizations under MACRA may submit PHI without patient authorization and that Al has
the potential to better identify opportunities for improvement to MACRA scores through
enhanced quality or efficiency).
63 See FutureAl Opportunities,supra note 58.
64 Id.
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AI will likely be used in conjunction with connected machines:
sensors and other Internet of Health Things technologies used for
remote monitoring. 65 Increasingly, Al and other advanced
technologies have the potential to be used for data analysis and to
augment value-based solutions, or Value = (Quality + Outcomes)/Cost.66
Nicolas P. Terry has described this model as the "New Iron Triangle,"
wherein Terry advocates for a more advanced and nuanced policy
model that expands the original focus on access, quality, and cost
containment to account for technological development. 67 With the
addition of AL natural language processing (NLP) approaches, some of
the most notorious sources of cost-containment issues, such as medical
coding inaccuracies, healthcare providers have the opportunity to
dramatically increase efficiency while simultaneously reducing
expensive mistakes. 68
Terry's model is exemplified with current Accountable Care
Organization initiatives. For example, CareAngel has positioned itself
as the first Al and Voice-Powered Virtual Nurse Assistant, which is
intended to reduce clinic visits and enable "aging in place" for older
adults. 69 See Figure 2, below, which illustrates the technology flow
from Al engagement with a patient to data aggregation and reporting
to healthcare providers.

&

65 Nicolas P. Terry, Appification, Al, and Healthcare'sNew Iron Triangle, 20 J. HEALTHCARE L.
POLY 117, 129-31 (2018).
66 Id. at 124.
67 Id. at 120-21.

68 Elliot B. Sloane & Ricardo J. Silva, Artificial Intelligence in Medical Devices and Clinical Decision
Support Systems, in CLINICAL ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 556, 560 (Ernesto Iadanza ed., 2d ed.
2020).
69 ACOs Use Virtual Nurse Assistants to Improve Patient Engagement and Outcomes, CAREANGEL
(Nov. 16, 2018, 3:11 PM), https://www.careangel.com/blog/what-it-means-to-be-anaccountable-care-organization (describing CareAngel's role in ACOs); The Power of AI and
CAREANGEL, https:/ /www.careangel.com/ai-and-voice-powered-virtual-nurseVoice,
assistant (lastvisited Mar. 14, 2021).
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Figure 2: CareAngel AI-Enabled Virtual Assistant 70
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A necessary function of the virtual assistant is interacting with the
patient; in fact, one of the major value-add functions of the CareAngel
is to report individually identifiable information to a system, which
determines the risk to the individual based on advanced AI-enabled
algorithms and notifies a patient's care team when indicators
demonstrate high risk to the patient7 1 CareAngel claims that this
functionality will result in 24 times existing clinical capacity and saves
three to four hours of clinician time per day.7 2
Without Al, CareAngel cannot fulfill its value proposition. If Al
using NLP did not direct the virtual assistant role, time savings would
not be realized. Without advanced machine-learning analytics,
presumably risk identification and reporting would be less accurate.
Similarly, data collected must be identifiable in nature: without
knowing who the patient is, it is impossible to fulfill CareAngel's chief
aims.
2. Healthcare Diagnostic Applications
AI-enabled healthcare diagnostic applications are positioned to
dramatically improve the accuracy, repeatability, and transferability
of expert knowledge, or democratizing medicine.7 3 These applications
are also positioned to save as much as $8 billion per year, though

70 The Power of AI and Voice, supra note 69.
71 Id.
72 Id.

73

W. Nicholson Price

II,

Artificial Intelligence in the Medical System: Four Roles for Potential

Transformation, 18 YALE J. HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS 122, 126-27; 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 122,

126-27 (2019).
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greater accuracy is the most persuasive benefit. 74 Indeed, precision
medicine offers the most potential for both diagnosis and treatment
protocol for serious diseases that often have a high mortality rate if
diagnosed incorrectly or too late. 75 AI-enabled healthcare diagnostic
applications include data from patient intake to lab results, diagnosis,
and expert recommendations for treatment.76 Depending on the type
of diagnostic applications, additional data could include imaging data
from radiological or other imaging systems, blood test results, and a
variety of other data depending on the type of disease or diagnosis.
Diagnostic algorithms now apply to a wide variety of diagnostic
applications. Cancer diagnostics have been a primary focus for Al,
leveraging partnerships with big technology companies, and
populating big data infrastructure with diagnostic data, imaging, and
treatment data from some of the most successful oncologists?7 One
example of these algorithms is QuantX, the first breast cancer imaging
diagnostic tool to be cleared by the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), 78 and the tool is used by radiologists to
improve the accuracy of diagnoses, rather than replacing these
specialists. 79 In a clinical study, QuantX resulted in a 39 percent
reduction of overlooked breast cancers and a 20 percent diagnostic
improvement. 80
Imaging algorithmic training usually requires actual diagnostic
data, such as radiological images, as well as individually identifiable
information from the individual. 81 QuantX, for example, analyzes MR

74 Future Al Opportunities, supra note 58.
75 Thomas Davenport & Ravi Kalakota, The Potentialfor Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare,
6 FUTURE HEALTHCARE J. 94,94-95 (2019).
76 See Price, supra note 73, at 127 (describing the functionality of the IDx-DR system).
77 Neil Savage, Another Set of Eyes for Cancer Diagnostics,579 NATURE 14,15 (2020).
78 Melissa Locker, This AI Breast Cancer Diagnostic Tool is the First to Get FDA Clearance, FAST
Co. (July 17, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90377791/quantx-is-first-ai-breastcancer-diagnostic-tool-cleared-by-fda.
79 Jack Carfagno, 5 FDA Approved Uses of Al in Healthcare, DOCWTRENEWS (July 18, 2019),
https://www.docwirenews.com/docwire-pick/future-of-medicine-picks/fda-approveduses-of-ai-in-healthcare/.
80 Id.

81 Jenifer Sunrise Winter & Elizabeth Davidson, Governance ofArtificial Intelligence and Personal
Health

Infonnation,

21 DIGITAL POLY, REG.

https://doi.org/10.1108/DPRG-08-2018-0048.

& GOVERNANCE (SPEC. ISSUE) 280 (2019),
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image data, including segments and user-selected regions of interest.82
However, it also requires information about positive and negative tests
and information about the individuals. 83 It is likely that at least some
of this information is individually identifiable. Part of the data set used
for training the QuantX algorithm originated from a previous but
similar study.84
3. AI-Enabled Robotic Surgery

Al has also become the new foundation for a variety of Internet of
Things devices as well as devices connected to internal hospital
networks. Al has optimized how devices function, enhanced humancomputer interactions, and transformed previously human-only
activities. Medical devices stand to benefit most from Al as such
devices supplant nursing care, clinic visits, and even surgery. Al is
increasingly being used for disease management as well as
treatment.85
Robotic surgery is one physical treatment technology that has the
potential to reduce recovery time while simultaneously reducing
surgical errors.8 6 Robotic surgery also has the potential to reduce
surgical costs by up to 29 percent, as much as a $40 billion in savings
annually. 87 In robotic surgery, a patient usually receives care from a
primary physician, who transfers health records about the individual
to a specialized surgeon who is trained in robotic surgery.
As part of any surgical process involving the use of a surgical
robot, information about the individual must be shared with a medical

82 FDA,

DEN170022,

EVALUATION

OF

AUTOMATIC

CLASS

FOR QUANTX DECISION
SUMMARY
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrhdocs/reviews/DEN170022.pdf
2020).

III

DESIGNATION

1-2,
(last visited Oct. 2,

83 Id.

84 Id. at 15.
85 See Alvin Powell, Al Revolution in Medicine, HARV. GAZETTE (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/11/risks-and-benefits-of-an-ai-revolutionin-medicine/.
86 Rafael E. Perez & Steven D. Schwaitzberg, Robotic Surgery: Finding Value in 2019 and Beyond,
4 ANNALS LAPAROSCOPIC & ENDOSCOPIC SURGERY 1,1 (2019).
87 Id. at 5

tbl.1 (citing Zhamak

Khorgami et al., Extra Costs of Robotic Surgery in Minor andMajor

Surgeries:An Analysis of National InpatientSample, 225 J. AM. C. SURGEONS e86 (2017)).
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device manufacturer prior to surgery. 88 Trainers or device supervisors
may be present in the surgery to ensure no issues occur during the
surgical process. 89 The surgical robot, to improve its movements and
detection sensors both during the surgery and after surgery, must also
collect data during surgery which will likely be valuable outside the
surgical environment. 90
For example, a kinetic surgical movement that worked most
effectively on a 33-year-old with a genetic predisposition for
cardiomyopathy and Type-1 diabetic comorbidity may not be as
effective on a 92-year-old with kidney disease, even if both patients are
receiving the same surgery. 91 In aggregate, understanding
effectiveness over time and across facilities may also be useful, which
could require retention of facility and treatment date data.
Ultimately, high-volume data stores are an essential ingredient for
all Al solutions and models, to varying extents.9 2 Without easy access
to data, algorithms will likely be less efficacious, and for some
applications, may be downright dangerous. Quality measures may be
inexact, leading to strategies that reduce available resources to
individuals who need these. Diagnostic tools may be ineffective,
resulting in misdiagnosis or unnecessary surgical interventions.
Robotic surgeries may be less exact, leading to devastating surgical
outcomes.

Although individually identifiable health data has the potential to
be misused, especially in aggregate, the countervailing value of data
for safety and efficacy purposes may encourage regulators to balance
these interests more effectively.

88 Ford et al., Rightsizing the Role of Medical Device Reps in the OR, THE SOURCE (2021),
https://healthtrustpg.com/thesource/cqo/rightsizing-role-medical-device-reps/.
89 Id.
90 Claire Jarvis, Robots are Surging in Popularity. So Will Their Data, UNDARK (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://undark.org/2019/08/15/surgical-robots-ae-suring-in-popularity/.
91 Robotic surgery, like most Al applications, are by their nature personalized. See James
Warner, Thanks to Al, Medical Treatments Are Becoming More Personalized,TNW (Dec. 11, 2019),
https:/ /thenextweb.com/syndication/2019/12/11/ thanks-to-ai-medical-treatments-arebecoming-more-personalized/.
92 Sabyasachi Dash et al., Big Datain Healthcare:Management, Analysis and FutureProspects, J. BIG
DATA 1, 3 (2019).
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II. HEALTH DATA REGULATION AND ITs LIMITATIONS
While data privacy laws aim to promote important goals,
including reducing the potential for abuse through data overcollection
and use, current health data regulations in the United States were not
designed for big data and Al data use. The current regulatory model,
as currently interpreted and employed, does not adequately promote
privacy interests or enable effective data use for important public
benefits. Data privacy laws should protect individuals while also
promoting responsible data use.
A. Privacy "Risk" in Health Data
Health data are exceptional. 93 Health data are unique in that they
exist because our bodies produce and perform to create them.
However, technology is required to collect, use, store, transfer, retain,
and ultimately delete data produced by our bodies. Some technologies
continuously siphon data from our bodies through pervasive
connectivity. 94 These data, then, become disembodied, separating the
person from their data when such data are processed and stored.
Health data are similarly exceptional because their unauthorized
use poses high risk: 1) misuse by medical professionals or staff; 2) data
stolen due to security vulnerabilities or poor security practices; and 3)
other concrete impacts resulting from improper data use or sharing,
such as employment discrimination, insurance coverage issues, legal
issues, or personal impacts. Because these risks are the consequence of
unauthorized data use and poor data security practices, they are
considered consequentialist. 95
Health privacy laws codify responses to consequentialist risks in
two ways: 1) sectoral privacy laws establish key regulatory
responsibilities for defined organizations to ensure they are aware of

93 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH
MATRIX 65, 66 (2014) (describing the nature of big data in health, from direct identifiers to
proxies for identifiability and the attendant regulations at the federal and state levels that and
strategies for resolving existing issues).

94 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61 WM. & MARY L. REv. 77, 81, 82, 116 (2019)
(exploring the realities of security issues related to pervasive connectivity, what Matwyshyn
calls "the gratuitous Internet problem").
95 See Price & Cohen, supra note 5, at 39.
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their responsibilities,96 and 2) these laws specify binding requirements
defined organizations must implement, usually preventative
procedural activities, or management-level controls. 97 For example,
organizations must verify the identity of a health data requestor prior
to disclosing identifiable information and organizations must engage
in appropriate management of legitimate access to health records and
access termination. 98 Laws like the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) require compliance with the Security
Rule to reduce the probability of data misuse and data breach.
In addition to these consequentialist risks, which primarily focus
on tangible negative consequences, health data privacy risks also
consist of deontological risks. 99 Deontological risks are risks that exist
in and of themselves and do not depend on negative consequences. 100
For example, if an organization collects an individual's data without
their knowledge, this could harm the individual's autonomy, or ability
to make a choice, even though no specific negative consequences, such
as data theft, result. Or perhaps a data breach occurs, exposing an
individual's data to a large group, but no direct negative harm results,
such as unfair treatment in the workplace.101 That individual's privacy
was compromised, even if the individual was not directly harmed.
Unfairness, as in exclusion or differential treatment, may fall
under this risk category, as these risks are injurious in and of
themselves to autonomy even if no further injury occurs in a
consequential manner. 102 Health privacy laws address deontological
concerns through data collection and use restrictions and limitations
on data sharing. For example, under many laws and broad Federal

§ 160.103. Covered entity and business associate are the two relevant roles specified
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.

96 45 C.F.R.

97 David Thaw, The Efficacy of CybersecurityRegulation, 30 GA. ST. L. REV. 287,324-25 (2014).
98 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.514(h),164.308(a)(4)(i). The HIPAA Security Rule, for example, includes
Administrative safeguards that are primarily procedural. See Charlotte A. Tschider, 26
ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 14 (2017) (describing the substantial focus of the Security Rule on
administrative specifications rather than technical requirements).
99 See Price & Cohen, supra note 5, at 39.
100 Id. at 3-4.
101 Id.

102 See Mason Marks, Artificial Intelligence-Based Suicide Prevention, 18 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y LAW
& ETH1cs 98, 117-18, 21 YALE J. L & TECH. 98, 117-18 (2019) (describing issues related to
differential treatment as 'autonomy risks').
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Trade Commission (FTC) authority, organizations must notify
individuals about their data handling practices, including potential
uses, and categories of third parties receiving data. 103 Notably, privacy
laws and regulatory health device clearance processes do not address
deontological concerns involving differential treatment, unfairness,
and discrimination due to automated decisioning. 104
At the federal level, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) codifies requirements that address both
consequentialist and deontological concerns. For example, HIPAA
requires data minimization for data collection and use consistent with
treatment, payment, and healthcare operations (required healthcare
activities, where data are essential for care and claims processing).105
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has also
codified a de-identification "safe harbor," which incentivizes reducing
identifiability of data sets by permitting broad use when typically
sensitive health data elements are not used. 106 These collectively
reduce the potential for negative consequences and independently set
limits on data collection and use.
On the surface, this combination of approaches blends a practical
approach to reducing risk while reinforcing privacy civil rights
through individual choice. 107 Unfortunately, the current model

103 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS.,

SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 9 (2013),

https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.htmil.

104

See Mason Marks, Algorithmic DisabilityDiscrimination,DISABILITY, HEALTH, LAW & BIOETHICS
at:
available
2020),
Press
Univ.
(Cambridge
246
242-44,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3338209;
Charlotte A. Tschider,
Medical Device Artificial Intelligence: The New Tort Frontier, 46 BYU L. REV. 1551, 1571 (2021)
(describing the reliance of the FDA on process-based, ineffectual solutions that do not prevent
discrimination).

105 SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE,
106 U.S.

DEPT.

OF HEALTH &

HUMAN

supra note 103, at 4.

SERVS.,

GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS FOR DEIDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE (Nov. 6, 2015),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/deidentification/index.html

&

107 However, choice is not necessarily achieved by these models. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy
as Contextual Inquiry, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 130 (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy SelfManagement and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1894 (2013); Neil Richards
Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologiesof Digital Consent, 96 WASH. L. REV. 1461, 1492; Charlotte
A. Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patients of the Future, 96 WASH. UNIV. L.
REV. 1505,1528 (2019).
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complicates legitimate data use necessary for complex technology and,
by extension, AI, while being highly ineffective for its autonomy riskmitigating and civil rights goals. 10 8 Four key areas where privacy laws
are essentially ineffective are notice, consent, consent revocation (or
notice and consent), and de-identification. 10 9

B. Regulatory Applicability
Medical devices, including medical software, medical diagnostic
or treatment applications, and AI-enabled wearable, implanted, or
standalone medical devices, are generally regulated for safety and
efficacy by the FDA.110 Although the FDA partially regulates
cybersecurity issues, it does not directly regulate for privacy."
108 See Terry, supra note 93, at 97 (quoting Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier's
concerns over big data).
109 Id. Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier describe this as anonymization, but within the United

States regulatory system the terminology is de-identification. To be sure, these standards are
distinctly different, especially when one reviews European Union laws and guidance on the
topic. In the main, de-identification and anonymization goals are the same: to strip
identifying characteristics, so that the rendered data set does not identify an individual to a
high probability. See generally Tschider, supra note 41 (describing these topics and their
limitations for purposes of privacy, security, and anti-discrimination goals). It should be
mentioned that although this paper does not directly address discrimination and other
autonomy risks, I position solving these issues via broad disclosure of processes by which Al
are created while hosting live Al to promote Al system testing by competitors. See Tschider,
supra note 11, at 715. C.f W. Nicholson Price 11 & Arti K. Rai, ClearingOpacity Through Machine
Learning, 106 IOWA L. REV. 775 (2021) (proposing broad data disclosure and non-intuitive
explanation to promote innovation, which could improve exploration of algorithmic
efficacy).
110 It should be noted that security requirements applicable in this area also do not follow
historical paths for reasonable security, largely due to both the big data infrastructure and
unusual characteristics of Al technologies. For a more comprehensive discussion of security
issues and potential solutions, see Charlotte Tschider, Deus ex Machina: Regulating
Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligencefor Patients of the Future, 5 SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 192
(2018) (describing issues in AI regulation by the FDA specifically related to cybersecurity
cyber-kinetic attacks of medical devices).

111

Id. It is encouraging that the FDA has begun reviewing cybersecurity for medical devices, as
this model will support privacy goals. However, the main concern for cybersecurity from the
FDA's perspective is device safety and efficacy, not privacy. General privacy requirements,
such as "reasonable privacy," may be included for specific device types, but it is often not
reviewed as part of device clearance or registration under 510(k) and PMA processes, even
for big data implementations and Al use. This is unsurprising given that even AI has not been
fully regulated, except for a discussion paper specific to imaging Al. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG.
ADMIN.,
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REGULATORY

FRAMEWORK

FOR

MODIFICATIONS

TO

ARTIFICIAL
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Healthcare privacy is enforced under the Department of Health and
Human Services 'Office for Civil Rights (OCR), for organizations
specifically defined under HIPAA.11 2
Notably, HHS does not regulate most health data uses under
HIPAA, which includes many consumer-facing health products,11 3
because these organizations do not meet the definitions of "covered
entity" or "business associate."1 1 4 The effect of these specific definitions
is that many organizations producing Al health technologies are
alternatively regulated under the Federal Trade Commission Act's
Section 5, which commissions the FTC to investigate and prosecute
unfair or deceptive trade practices.11 5 The FTC has created guidelines
for health data apps and more broadly for privacy through the Fair
Information Practices. 116 Although neither are directly legally binding,
they do provide some indication to how the FTC interprets privacy
practices, which are usually represented in consent decrees.11 7
Although these parallel regulation tracks do address the privacy
of health data to some extent, neither appropriately regulates health
AI. 118 Ultimately, the calculus of risk and benefit in health Al data is
unique, necessitating more nuanced privacy models than the models

INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD)
7-8 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020). Although comparatively speaking, the FDA does partially
regulate cybersecurity for these systems, cybersecurity requirements have been similarly
short-sighted.

112 The Office for Civil Rights (OCR), a division of HHS enforces HIPAA, although HHS
generally establishes rules associated with the law, as described in Part R1.
113 See W. Nicholson Price 1I & Margot E. Kaminski et al., Shadow Health Records Meet New Data

Privacy Laws, 363 Sci. 448,448 (Feb. 1, 2019).
114 See Tschider, supra note 110, at 201-02; see infra Part 11(D) and accompanying notes.

115

17 C.F.R. § 248.3(a)(1)-(2) (2018).

116 Mobile

Health Apps

Interactive Tool,

U.S.

FED.

TRADE

COMM'N

(Apr.

2016),

https:/ /www.ftc.gov/ tips-advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-health-appsinteractive-tool; U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N [hereinafter, FTC PRIVACY ONLINE],

PRIVACY
(1998),
https:/ /www.ftc.gov/ sites/default/files/ documents/reports/privacy-online-reportcongress/priv-23a.pdf (describing the FIPs in detail).
ONLINE:

A

REPORT

TO

CONGRESS

7-8

117 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COL.
L. REV., 583, 600-04 (2014) (describing the expansion of jurisdiction and FTC enforcement
creating a de facto role of the FTC as primary privacy authority).

118 See generally Tschider, supra note 108 (describing the overreliance of HLPAA and the FTC on
the concept of consent).
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that have populated privacy laws and practices for nearly two
decades. 119
C. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Although the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) and its most recent update, the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009
(HITECH)1 2 0 regulate organizations that qualify as a covered entity
(healthcare providers, healthcare clearinghouses, and health plans)
and their third parties (business associates), the collective legislation
has been hailed one of the most comprehensive in the United States. 121
1. History and Purpose of Health Data Collection under HIPAA
When HIPAA was passed in 1996, Congress was only beginning
to understand the potential for a computing future. For example, the
House Ways and Means Committee, in reviewing HIPAA's text,
specifically noted the need to protect patient privacy, but it was
contextualized within healthcare delivery: "Confidentiality-In
determining what information is required, the Secretary shall include
procedures to assure that the privacy of individuals receiving
healthcare services is appropriately protected." 122 Ways and Means
also noted the importance of data in transferability to different
providers or insurers, or the "portability" in the Health Insurance
Portabilityand Accountability Act.123
HIPAA, both in name and as described in the Committee's review
of the proposed law, was created initially to promote the portability of
insurance coverage from one provider to another in an effort to avoid
119 It should be noted that some sectors may have somewhat similar risk profiles, such as the
automotive industry for self-driving cars. However, with healthcare technologies, the data
collected have the potential to impact individuals more severely due to the highly sensitive
and externally valuable nature of individually identifiable health data.

120 Health Information Technology and Quality, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300jj (West 2020).
121 Daniel

J.

Solove, HIPAA Mighty and Flawed: Regulation Has Wide-Reaching Impact on the

Healthcare
Industry,
84
J.
AHIMA
http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=106326#.YEj7SWhKg2w.

30,
30
(2013),
As Solove describes, HIPAA

does not manage data gatekeeping particularly well-while on one hand HIPAA may restrict
access, in others it may not permit legitimate and useful access to PHI.
122 H.R. REP. No. 104-496(1), at 24 (1996).
123 Id. at 34-35.
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job lock, or the risk of losing health insurance continuity when
changing jobs. 124 Necessarily, transferred insurance coverage meant
transferring identifiable health data, and there would be no need for
insurance at all without providing healthcare.
In addition to the transfer of data for purposes of healthcare
provisioning and insurance reimbursement, consistency of health data
for reimbursement and billing purposes relied on third-party review
of medical coding prior to data transfers, as in independent audits. 125
Healthcare clearinghouses review non-standard data and assigned
codes to reduce errors and streamline reimbursement and billing
processes. 126 It is no surprise that these organizations, in 1996, were
defined exclusively as covered entities, as they are essential to
healthcare provisioning and reimbursement and within the original
Act's primary contemplation. 127
From its initial beginnings, HIPAA was intended to facilitate data
sharing for practices core to provisioning healthcare, and the HITECH
Act's update to HIPAA focused on strengthening its protections while
simultaneously moving towards digitization of health data. 128 HHS
describes HITECH as "promot[ing] the adoption and meaningful use
of health information technology." 129
124 Id. at 1, 280.
125 PHYSICIANS ADVOCACY INST., INC., MEDICAL AUDITS: WHAT PHYSICIANS NEED TO KNOW (June

2013), https://www.ncmedsoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PAIMedicalAudits.pdf.
&

126 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C. F. R. pts. 160

164 (2002).
127 Commenters on the proposed 2000 Privacy Rule advocated for expanding the definition to
apply to any organization that receives or maintains PHI. However, the reference to such
entities under 1173(a)(1) in the 19% Act seemed to have tied HHS 'hands with respect to the
Privacy Rule. See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Standards for Privacy of Individually

IdentifiableHealthInformation. Final Rule Preamble[hereinafter, HHS Preamble] (Dec. 28, 2000),
https:/ /aspe.hhs.gov/report/standards-privacy-individually-identifiable-healthinformation-final-privacy-rule-preamble. Furthermore, HIPAA was passed as an update to
ERISA, which regulates private insurance, and includes, for example, the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), which provided for continuation of insurance
coverage following employment separation. The contextual passage of HIPAA, therefore,
reinforced its focus on regulating healthcare and reimbursement related to insurance
coverage.

128 Main Goals of HITECH: Everything You Need to Know, RSI SEC. BLOC (Dec. 6, 2019),
https:/ /blog.rsisecurity.com/main-goals-of-hitech-everything-you-need-to-know/.
129 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HITECH ACT ENFORCEMENT INTERIM FINAL RULE

CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER

153

Despite this focus on insurance portability, Congress had the
foresight to anticipate potential risks attendant to health data
digitization. With the advent of computerized technologies, storage
and transfer of these data introduced new security risks and
complicated existing patient privacy issues. After being unable to draft
rules specific to privacy and security themselves, Congress appointed
HHS to create the Privacy and Security Rules. 130
2. Covered Entities and Their Business Associates
HIPAA extends from a covered entity to its third-party business
associates indirectly through the covered entity's contract with its
business associates 131 under a Business Associate Agreement, in the
event a business associate is located outside of the United States, and
directly when business associates are located within the United
States. 132
An organization may be a covered entity or business associate
under HIPAA but not be subject to its requirements if the information
collected, used, transferred, or stored is not Protected Health
Information (PHI).133 PHI is individually identifiable health data
pertaining to previous or current mental or physical health
conditions. 134 Although the definition is broad, information is not PHI
when it has been de-identified - stripped of its identifying
characteristics -and HIPAA-regulated organizations are not required
to comply with HIPAA for properly de-identified data sets. 135 For
(June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/hitech-actenforcement-interim-final-rule/index.html.
130 SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supranote 103.
131 Id. A business associate is a named organization that processes, transmits, or stores
individually identifiable health data, also known as Protected Health Information, or PHI,

under HIPAA.
132 Id. Prior to HITECH's passage, HIPAA directly regulated covered entities but not their
business associates. The HITECH Act extended HIPAA's obligations directly to business
associates within its regulatory purview, specifically U.S.-based business associates.
133 45 C.F.R.
134

§ 160.103 (2014).

Id.

135 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), 164.514(a) and (b). It should be noted that de-identification does
not change the covered entity or business associate status of an entity; rather, it renders the
application of the three rules - the Privacy Rule, Security Rule, and Data Breach Notification
Rule-moot. Under HIPAA, there is nothing to secure and no rights to protect when
identification characteristics have been stripped.
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example, using de-identified data for additional purposes will not
trigger a requirement to execute individual patient authorizations.
Similarly, organizations that do not fall under the definition of a
covered entity (or a non-covered entity organization's business
associates) will not be regulated under HIPAA, even if they collect,
use, transfer, or store individually identifiable health data that would
otherwise meet the definition of PHI. Ultimately, HIPAA-regulated
status requires two reinforcing requirements: 1) status as a covered
entity or as a covered entity's business associate and 2) data that are
considered PHI.
Therefore, organizations that collect, use, process, or store health
data but are not covered entities or their business associates and
organizations that may be covered entities or business associates but
manage or possess de-identified data according to HIPAA's Deidentification Safe Harbor standard, are not required to follow HIPAA.
Rather, these organizations are subject to the FTC's Section 5
enforcement. 136
Consent and the HIPAA Privacy Rule

3.

The Privacy Rule's discussion crossed two administrations and
was subject to separate notice/comment periods, wherein the subject
of consent prompted much debate. The Privacy Rule was eventually
passed in 2000, after 52,000 public comments, and updated in 2002 at
the direction of a new administration. 137
One of the most significant 2002 updates was making consent to a
Notice of Privacy Practices, which covered standard services like
treatment, payment, and healthcare operations, a good-faith
acknowledgement of receipt rather than an overt requirement for
healthcare providers. 138 Despite patients, patient advocates, and
physicians generally supporting a consent requirement, health plans,
136

In fact, the enforcement arm of HHS, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) seems to view the
FTC's enforcement abilities as co-extensive with its own, even for practices squarely within
HIPAA's ambit. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFF. CIv. RTS, SHARING CONSUMER
(Oct. 2016),
INFORMATION? LOOK TO HIPAA AND THE FTC ACT
HEALTH

https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf-0219_sharing-health-info-hippaftcact%20508.pdf.
137 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, 66 Fed. Reg. 40 (Feb. 28, 2001); see SUMMARY OF THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 103.
138 SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 103.

CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER

155

employers, and institutional providers resisted a consent
requirement. 139 HHS ultimately sided with institutional commenters
but adopted consent for authorization of PHI record release while
enabling good-faith acknowledgement for basic healthcare functions:
We stated our concern that the blanket consents that individuals sign
today provide these individuals with neither notice nor control over

how their information is to be used. While we retain those concerns, we
also understand that for many who participate in the health care system,
the acts of providing and obtaining consent represent important values
that these parties wish to retain. Many individuals argued that
providing consent enhances their control; many advocates argued that
the act of consent focuses patient attention on the transaction; and many
health care providers argued that obtaining consent is part of ethical

behavior.140

Ultimately, the 2000 Final Rule included consent for healthcare
providers. At the time, it was the understanding of HHS that
individually identifiable health data were already the subject of
consent-based models at most providers and that patients were
familiar with the model of notice and consent due to ethical obligations
healthcare providers typically must fulfill. 141 Despite these parallels,
the 2002 update to the privacy rule stripped explicit consent for
purposes.
operations
and
healthcare
payment,
treatment,
Furthermore, because HIPAA does not preempt more restrictive
privacy requirements, states subsequently passed laws requiring
explicit consent.
Of course, not all consent in the privacy context is the same.
Primary use is data use that is tightly connected to core services
provided and uses are tightly related to those services, while
secondary use concerns data use outside these core services.1 42 For

139 HHS Preamble, supranote 127.
140 Id.
141 This article does not address any potential changes to informed consent processes in Al,
although effectiveness in informed consent is essential for purposes of non-privacy risks. For
a comprehensive treatment of informed consent, see Valerie Gutmann Koch, Eliminating
Liabilityfor Lack of Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1211 (2019). For
a specific discussion on AI and informed consent, see I. Glenn Cohen, Informed Consent and

Medical Artificial Intelligence: What to Tell the Patient?108 GEo. L. J. 1425 (2020).
142 Charlotte A. Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choicefor Patientsof the Future, % WAsH.

L. REV. 1505, 1514 (2018).

HODS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y

156

some uses, consent is required, for others it is not.143 For example, if
data are used to perform a blood test, this is likely reasonably
connected to the reason why a patient is visiting a healthcare provider,
and only a good-faith acknowledgement is needed because data use is
reasonably expected. However, if data are used to engage in marketing
activities, these activities are likely not expected by a patient. But what
happens if secondary uses are not expected by a patient but are
nevertheless highly beneficial to them and consent through formal
authorization is difficult or impossible to facilitate?
A HIPAA Notice of Privacy Practices is provided for treatment,
payment, and healthcare operations, which are reasonably predictable
activities that are also necessary and crucial to provisioning healthcare,
or primary uses.144 However, HIPAA does contemplate exigent
circumstances, such as when providing a Notice of Privacy Practices is
not practical or useful.? 45 In these situations, a Notice of Privacy
Practices is provided when it is reasonably possible to do so, such as
when an emergency situation has stabilized or within a reasonable
time after a beneficiary has selected their insurance benefits.
A Notice of Privacy Practices requires organizations to disclose
information related to their own practices, categories of third parties
providing service on behalf of the organization, a covered entity's
obligations, the covered entity's contact details, and articulation of a
patient's rights with respect to their data.1 46 HIPAA requires some
specificity with regard to disclosed uses:
(A) A description,

including at least one example,

of the types

of uses and disclosures that the covered entity is permitted by this
subpart to make for each of the following purposes: treatment, payment,
and health care operations.
(B) A description of each of the other purposes for which the covered
subpart to use or
by this
required
or
permitted
entity is

disclose protected health information without the individual's written
authorization. [...]
(D) For each purpose described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) or (B) of this
the

section,

description

143 Id. at 1515.

144 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(a)-(b) (2013).
145 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2013).
146 45 C.F.R.

§ 164.520(b) (2013).

must include

sufficient

detail

to place
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the individual on notice of the uses and disclosures that are permitted

or required by this subpart and other applicable law.
(E) A description of the types of uses and disclosures that require an
.] a statement that other uses and disclosures not
authorization [.

described in the notice will be made only with the individual's written
authorization, and a statement that the individual may revoke an
authorization [.. .]147

Primary use should not surprise a patient: it is core to providing
the service so long as the minimum necessary rule applies and data
collection does not dramatically exceed what is needed to provide the
service. 148 Secondary use, however, is auxiliary, tangential, and
unanticipated by the patient. 149 Although it may be connected in some
way to primary services provided, data use outside primary treatment,
payment, and healthcare operations generally would not be
reasonably expected by a patient and usually require greater
disclosure and explicit consent. 15 0 For example, seeing a doctor about
a potential respiratory infection and sharing your information for that
purpose is not the same as your doctor then submitting these data to a
pharmaceutical company developing new nasal decongestant
products.
Under HIPAA, no consent is needed for primary use, but
secondary use requires an authorization document combined with
explicit, written consent and an expiration date or event. 15 1 In contrast
with Notice requirements, an authorization document requires far
more detail, including the specific third party to which PHI will be
disclosed (if applicable), more specificity in use disclosure, and
termination date or activities. 15 2 Any PHI data use outside treatment,
payment, or healthcare operations requires an organization to execute
an authorization. 153

147 45 C.F.R.

§ 164.520(b)(1)(ii)

(2013).

148 See Tschider, supra note 142.

149
150

Secondary Use of Your Personal Information, OFF. INFO. & PRIVACY COMM'R FOR B.C. (Apr. 17,
2018), https:/ /www.oipc.bc.ca/news/secondary-use-of-your-personal-information.
HIPAA requires authorization for these uses, and functionally most secondary uses require

additional consent be collected. 45 C.F.R §§ 164.508(a)(2)-(4), (b)(5) (2013).
151 Id.
152 45 C.F.R § 164.508 (2013).
153 Id.
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Privacy notices like the Notice of Privacy Practices and the
authorization document are designed to assist patients in assessing the
potential for health data privacy risks. However, notice and consent
only works effectively when patients have a meaningful choice. 154 This
means, for example, that patients may select an alternative covered
entity and avoid risk posed by the covered entity's data handling
practices. It may also mean that a patient may refuse to sign an
authorization. However, there are numerous reasons why meaningful
choice is not as effective in a healthcare setting, and notice and consent
is generally ineffective as primary privacy mechanisms.
4. Identifiability and De-Identification
An often ignored but foundational pre-supposition of HIPAA is
that organizations collecting data adhere to the "minimum necessary"
rule.155 Although frequently this rule seems to apply to specified uses
as disclosed in the Notice of Privacy Practices and authorization
documents, it is derived from confidentiality codes in medicine that
apply broadly.1 56 The minimum necessary rule properly applies to all
actions and activities related to the PHI data ecosystem including
collection, use, and disclosure.1 57 Despite these clear requirements,
organizations may not consider how data sharing, data retention, or
identifiability status affects a continuing obligation to follow the
minimum necessary rule. After-all, if data are not duplicated through
sharing, do not exist at all, or are rendered non-identifiable, there are
far fewer risks to patients.1 58

154

See Tschider, supra note 142, at 1519-28.

155

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d).

156 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MINIMUM NECESSARY REQUIREMENT (Apr. 4, 2003),

https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/minimum-necessaryrequirement/index.html.
157 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. FOR CIV. RTs., COLLECTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE
LIMITATION: THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN
A

NETWORKED

ENVIRONMENT

1,

https://www.hhs.gov/sites/ default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/hea
lthit/collectionusedisclosure.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
158 Mary Branscombe, Data Deletion: Your Data Strategy's Greatest Defense, CIO MAG. (July 3,
2019), https://www.cio.com/article/3405129/data-deletion-your-data-strategys-greatestdefense.html.
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Without appropriately implementing the minimum necessary
rule, consequentialist and deontological risks dramatically increase for
patients. After all, simply having more PHI stored in a database than
is actually necessary increases the probability that such PHI could be
misused unintentionally or deliberately. 159 It also means such data
could be subject to a data breach. 160 If third-party relationships result
in several transfers of PHI to a wide variety of organizations, some of
which could have differing privacy or security practices, the
possibility of misuse also increases, especially when such data are
identifiable or retained longer than needed.
Although frequently organizations focus on the notice and (where
applicable) consent model (disclosure) to procedurally approximate
patient choice for data collection, these same organizations often do
not exert much diligence after data have been collected. Historically,
HHS addressed this issue by creating the De-identification Safe
Harbor ('Safe Harbor'), which permitted complete data use (including
sharing and selling data) if data organizations collected or managed
were de-identified.1 61
The question of identifiability was a point of discussion when
HHS solicited public feedback on the Privacy Rule. Specifically,
commenters advocated to define PHI as directly individually
identifiable personal information, rather than include indirectly
identifiable data. 162 Commenters saw value in indirectly identifiable
personal information for research purposes, data that do not directly
identify an individual person. 163 Usually, directly identifiable data
might include a name or other pervasive identifier like a medical

159 This is precisely why many risk qualification and quantification approaches for cybersecurity
actually include "number of records" as an input into the calculation. See Miryam Meir, The 2
Types of Risk Assessment Methodology, SEC. SCORECARD BLDG (June 15, 2020),
https://securityscorecard.com/blog/types-of-risk-assessment-methodology; Joey Beachum,
Top Under-the-radarCybersecurity Threats You May Not See Coming, HUBBARD DECISION RES.
(June 17, 2019), https://hubbardresearch.com/category/htma/how-to-measure-anythingin-cybersecurity-risk/.
160 How to Prevent A Data Breach at Your Business, INSUREON SMALL BUS. BLOG (2021),
https:/ /www.insureon.com/blog/how-to-prevent-a-data-breach-at-your-business.
161 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS
FOR DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY AcT (Nov. 6, 2015).

162 See HHS Preamble, supra note 127.
163 Id.

160
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record number. However, indirectly identifiable data are data that
may provide information about an individual that is personal in nature
but generally is not used to identify an individual. 164
De-identification processes render individually identifiable data
no longer identifiable, within an acceptable level of risk to the
individual, and the Safe Harbor offers two options for demonstrating
de-identification: 1) removal of 18 identifiers from a data set or 2)
expert determination.1 65 The predefined 18 identifiers are commonly
collected data elements that are pervasive identifiers of an
individual.1 66 For example, a person's birth date is considered a
pervasive identifier, but a numerical age is not unless it is over age
89.167 Unless a covered entity or business associate independently
knows that a data set is identifiable, stripping these 18 identifiers
renders a data set de-identified under the Safe Harbor.1 68
Usually reserved for scenarios when a covered entity or business
associate cannot effectively strip all 18 identifiers, an alternative path
to de-identification is expert determination.1 69 Expert determination
relies on statistical analysis of a data set to determine whether the risk
of reidentification is negligible, rendered by an independent party.170
The expert determination path may be used when a data element that
should be stripped by the Safe Harbor method must be retained for
some business reason. For example, the implantation date for an AIenabled artificial pancreas or the hospital where it was implanted
might be tremendously valuable for determining if an AI's algorithmic
update caused potential safety issues in that time period. It may also
help to determine which hospitals are most effectively working with

164 See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,

supra note 161.

165 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b).
166

Id.

167 Id.
168 The independent knowledge caveat to the de-identification Safe Harbor is a curious
addition,

in that it seems to almost anticipate the use of big data and Al algorithms. Independently
knowing that a data set has the ability to identify an individual usually means the data
scientist is using that data to identify or target an individual or an algorithm can select an
individual from their representative data, or reidentification. A BA's rights to de-identify or
otherwise use data supplied to it, even after de-identification, are usually specified within a
data use agreement, which allocates contractual rights with respect to data.
169 See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 161.
170 Id.
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Expert
product, enabling replication of strong processes.
determination could demonstrate that although these direct identifiers
(date of implantation and implantation location) are retained, the data
set overall poses very low risk of reidentification, permitting data to
be shared or used without restriction.
The minimum necessary rule combined with the availability of deidentification is perhaps the most valuable privacy contribution under
HIPAA for Al. It is the relationship between constraint (minimum
necessary) and affordance (de-identification) that most accurately
represents the twin challenges of Al: data maximization to create
reliable, safe, and accurate Al while minimizing data use to avoid
patient privacy harms. Any AI-friendly privacy model must permit
data use when it benefits the patient and restrict data use when data
retention poses risk without accompanying benefit.
D. The Federal Trade Commission Act
Despite its limited application to these named organizations,
HIPAA is still the most comprehensive health data law currently in
existence at the federal or state level, codifying reasonably specific yet
flexible privacy and security requirements. 171 However, no federal
healthcare privacy law applies to data collected broadly outside
covered entities and their business associates, such as health app
technology providers or medical device manufacturers that are not
covered entities and their business associates. 172
As a result, the FTC and state regulators have stepped in, though
their privacy models replicate the limitations of HIPAA such as notice
and consent.173 Notably, while the FTC does enforce Section 5 for
privacy and security practices, the inexactitude of when the FTC
enforces and what is enforced is left up to administrative discretion. 174
171 See Tschider, supra note 2, at 12; Solove, supra note 121.
172 See Tschider, supra note 142, at 1515-16.

173 Id. at 1515-17.
174 Through its consent orders, the FTC has established a type of "common law," at least as it
pertains to FTC actions for privacy. This body of administrative enforcement has created
some degree of predictability as to the FTC's interpretation of unfair or deceptive trade
practices under Section 5 for privacy activities, which generally follow the Fair Information

Practices (FIPs). See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law
of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583,627 (2011) (illustrating how the FTC has established a body
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Much of the specific direction given to organizations collecting, using,
processing, or storing individually identifiable, non-HIPAA regulated
personal health data, is rendered non-binding, such as the FTC's Fair
Information Practices, health app guidance, and consent decrees
enforcing these non-binding sources of truth.175
A closer look at the Fair Information Practices illustrates a fairly
simplistic view of privacy, absent effective context, although to be fair,
the FTC's understanding of privacy has come a long way since 1998.
Notice and consent, similar to HIPAA, procedurally automates choice
without really providing individuals with meaningful choice. 176 Data
minimization is not explicitly mentioned, only purpose limitations,
wherein data collection and use should be limited to the purposes
specified in the privacy notice.177 Overall, this can be interpreted to
mean that, so long as an organization identifies itself, communicates
its purpose for collecting data, provides the ability for someone to "opt
out," and provides an individual with a list of data it has collected
about them when requested, it can collect highly identifiable and
sensitive data without restriction and retain it indefinitely.
E. The California Consumer Protection Act
States have begun legislating to address the gap in broad personal
information protection. For example, the highly publicized and often
criticized California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) requires more
rigorous privacy protections when organizations that receive personal
information from California residents or are located in California. 178
Organizations complying with CCPA may opt to extend its protections
across the U.S. for ease of overall data and privacy operations

of law that functions in part like the common law). The concept of common law has not
necessarily extended to privacy protections through improved security. See Justin (Gus)

Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC's UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 968-971 (2016)
(illustrating why the FTC has not successfully extended its approach to privacy to security,
as well). Hurwitz describes how administrative enforcement does not have the same function
as the common law in establishing predictive outcomes, as in the common law. Id. at 984.
175 See FTC PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 116, at 7-11.
%

176 See Charlotte A. Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Patientsof the Future,
WASH. L. REV. 1505, 1516 (2018); FTC PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 116, at 7.
177 See FTC PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 116, at 15.
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(a)(1)-(2), (4), (7).
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management, and indeed other states have begun to replicate it.179
Under the CCPA, organizations otherwise subject to HIPAA are
excused from its requirements, presumably only for their HIPAAregulated activities. 180
CCPA does not perform much better than general FTC guidance,
although its requirements are codified and apply across sectors. 181 This
approach offers a state-based "catch-all" for organizations that are not
regulated under HIPAA, though unfortunately much of CCPA
replicates the same issues with notice and consent and anonymization,
effectively restricting data usability which may not be beneficial for Al
goals.
For example, the CCPA mandates a detailed privacy notice and
does not require consent unless personal information will be sold or
used for a secondary purpose not disclosed at the time of notice, or if
the individual is a minor. 182 Notably, it does not include any explicit
data minimization requirement, though it encourages deidentification activities through a "reasonableness" standard for deidentification. 183 This standard prohibits reidentification of the
consumer, unlike the HHS de-identification safe harbor, which
permits reidentification.
F. Collective Privacy Approaches
Overall, HIPAA, the FTC Fair Information Practices, and the
CCPA replicate long-standing privacy strategies, which do not
effectively balance Al interests with privacy interests. See Table 1 for a
comparison between the regulations. In Part III, we will discuss how
179 Kayvan Alikhani, California's CCPA Triggers A Tsunami of State-Level Data Privacy Laws,
2020),
(Feb.
20,
FORBEs
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/02/20/californias-ccpa-triggers-atsunami-of-state-level-data-privacy-laws/#209913dd6cad.

§ 1798.145(c)(1). There is some debate as to whether the CCPA offers
exemptions for any data deemed PHI or whether an organization must be regulated by
HHS for both PHI and covered entity/business associate status. It seems likely that the
CCPA's drafters desired not to duplicate or overregulate in the HIPAA space.

180 CAL. CIV. CODE

181 The CCPA does include an express carve-out for HIPAA and state healthcare law-regulated
organizations, seemingly acknowledging that HIPAA includes far more specificity than the

CCPA. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(c)(1)(A).
182 CAL. CIV. CODE

§§

999.305, 999.307 (notice of financial incentives to providing personal

information), 999.330, 1798.120(c).
183 CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 1798.140(h).
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these combined approaches are poorly suited for Al technologies and,
in particular, patient interests.

Table 1: Legal Comparison

CCPA

FTC

HIPAA

Law
Applicability

Covered entities and
their business
associates when
access/process/
store/retain PHI

All organizations
doing business in
the U.S.

Organizations doing
business with
California residents
or operating in
California (with $$
requirements)

Notice

Notice of Privacy
Practices;
Authorization

Privacy Notice

Privacy Notice

Consent

Acknowledgement
of receipt; Consent;
consent revocation

Implied consent;
opt-out consent
revocation

Implied consent
except in specific
circumstances; optout consent
revocation

Minimum

Yes

No

No

Yes, Safe Harbor (18
identifiers; expert
determination)

No specific
direction,
presumed
available

Yes, reasonable
technology + no
reidentification

Necessary
DeIdentification
available

III. INCONSISTENT PRIVACY AND AI AIMS

HIPAA, the FTC Fair Information Practices, and the CCPA all
codify a model that focuses on privacy without appropriately
balancing individual rights and potential risks with data needs for
safe, effective, and fair healthcare Al, or what this author calls data
essentialism.184 Notice and consent, data minimization, and de184

See Epstein & Tschider, supra note 36.
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identification demonstrate key
technologies and privacy law.

incompatibilities

between

Al

A. Notice and Consent
As described in Part II, notice and consent in the United States is
the preferred procedural mechanism for individual choice. The role of
consent, at least in the United States, is to manifest some agreement to
a proposed scheme of individually identifiable data processing.
Notice and consent, unfortunately, is not without limitations. It is
ineffective precisely due to five key problems, or "the consent myth":
1) voluntariness, 2) structural limitations, 3) cognition issues, 4)
exogeneity, and 5) temporal issues.185
1. Lack of Patient Choice in the Healthcare Industry
Healthcare is one area where the concept of "choice" becomes
murky, in large part because of the inherent disparity in knowledge,
access to information, and complexity of relationships between
healthcare providers, insurers, and medical device manufacturers that
create medical Al. This complexity creates fewer medical choices (and
sometimes only one choice) for patients. Fewer insurance and medical
choices result in fewer medical device options, which collectively limit
the ability of patients to influence their healthcare privacy options
overall.
Patients depend on their doctors and healthcare providers, which
necessitates trust, a key element of any privacy-based relationship,
especially for fiduciaries like physicians. 186 However, although a
healthcare provider may think a particular treatment is best or
consistent with a new standard of care, treatment options may be
limited by what the patient's insurance will cover (whether
government-provided or private insurer), which may influence
185 Tschider, supra note 142, at 1519-28. Richards and Hartzog similarly note the concept of
"unwitting consent," which also explains issues of voluntariness, structural limitations,
cognitive issues, and exogeneity problems. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 107, at 1478-84.
They also note the concerns of coercion in data collection and use, which reduce the function
of voluntariness, especially when alternative options are limited. Id. at 1486-87. Finally, some
versions of consent are not consent at all: such as when an individual is not capable or may
be incapacitated. Id. at 1490-91.
186 See generally ARI EzRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST (Cambridge Univ. Press: 2018)
(describing the essential nature of trust in relational constructs).
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whether a doctor recommends a course of treatment or not.187 Indeed,
insurers may offer more favorable reimbursement to healthcare
providers for certain medical devices and may decline reimbursement
altogether for others.1 88
Reimbursement for the use of health Al outside clinical trials, as
in diagnostics or medical device use, is dependent on the type of
insurance provided (e.g., HMO, PPO, Medicaid) and preexisting
reimbursement models between insurers and providers, which are
often opaque to patients.1 89 Often patients do not have many insurance
options available, whether from an employer, on the "open" Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace, or from the
government, all of which tie covered persons to an insurer's
reimbursement policies, including preferred diagnostics or devices.1 90
For example, a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)-based
insurance plan usually requires an individual to select a primary

187 Susan B. Yeon, The Scope of Medicare Reimbursementfor New Medical Devices: Impact on Device

Availability

and
the
Standard of
Care,
LEDA
AT
HARV.
L.
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8852165/syeon.html?sequence=2

ScH.,
(last

visited July 31, 2021).
188 WMen Insurers and Doctors Haggle Over Medicaid Costs, Patients Pay the Price, MEDICALXPRESS
26,
2021),
(July
patients-price.html.

https://medicaxpress.com/news/2021-07-doctors-haggle-medicaid-

-

189 Reimbursement: A Medical Device Company's Worst Nightmare?, MASTERCONTROL (Aug. 12,
https://www.mastercontrol.com/gxp-lifeline/reimbursement-a-medical-device2015),
company's-worst-nightmare-/; Understanding Reimbursement for Medical Devices: Coding,
Coverage, Payment, and Payors, THE ATTicuS GROUP BLOG
(Jan 1, 2017),
https:/ / theatticusgroup.net/understanding-reimbursement-medical-devices-codingcoverage-payment-payors/; David P. Lind, Secret Contracts Between Insurers and Providers
Who Benefits?, HEARTLAND HEALTH RES. INST. BLOG (Nov. 13, 2018), https://hhri.net/secretcontracts-between-insurers-and-providers-who-benefits/.
190 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment

Parameters for 2012, 78 Fed. Reg. 15410 (March 11, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 153, 155,

&

156, 157, & 158). Under the ACA, individual markets have limited offerings of insurers
available in that geographic location. For example, some counties only have one insurer
available, though this rate has improved substantially since 2018. Daniel McDermott

Cynthia Cox, Insurer Participation on the ACA Marketplaces, 2014-2021 (Nov. 23, 2020),
https:/ /www.kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/insurer-participation-on-the-acamarketplaces-2014-2021/. The creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) could also
reduce competition as they incentivize healthcare consolidation. Issac D. Buck, Furtheringthe
Fiduciary Metaphor: The Duty of Providers to the Payers of Medicine, 104 CAL. L. REv. 1043,1078

(2016).
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provider. 191 Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) usually carry
significant financial incentives to select a primary provider and receive
care there. 192 Medicare and Medicaid certify specific providers to
receive reimbursement funds.193 These concepts reflect a higher degree
of coercion than the typical marketplace because deviating from these
limited options is financially undesirable.
Physicians who deviate from the reimbursement model of the
patient's insurer risk protracted appeal processes or no reimbursement
at all. 194 In some situations, the remaining cost is billed to the patient,
in others the provider must absorb the cost. 195 Overall, although
physicians often do and should recommend an appropriate care plan
for an individual, reimbursement challenges likely affect what is
ultimately recommended to patients. 196 The increased consolidation of
providers similarly has reduced patient options. 197
The lack of alternative options for AI technologies, such as
diagnostic Al or connected medical devices like a surgical robot or an
insulin pump, further limits a patient's choices. Diagnostic Al
technologies specifically do not have many competitors precisely
because they are transformative and cutting-edge. Connected medical
devices, especially those incorporating Al, likely do not have many
competitors because of the complexity of such technologies and
market dynamics, as in many innovative products, alongside a heavy

191 What

Types of Health Plans Are Available?,

NH

HEALTH

COST

(Apr.

9,

2018),

https://nhhealthcost.nh.gov/guide/question/what-types-health-plans-are-available-0.
192 Id.; Adam Felman, How are PPO and HMO Medicare Different?, MED. NEWS TODAY (Apr. 15,
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/how-are-ppo-and-hmo-medicare2020),
different.

193 Become a Medicare Provider or Supplier, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID (Dec. 1, 2020),
https:/ /www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/Become-aMedicare-Provider-or-Supplier.
194 See Lind, supranote 189; When Insurersand Doctors HaggleOver Medicaid Costs, supranote 188.
195 Joshua W. Axene, Paying HealthcareProviders:The Impact of Provider Reimbursement on Overall
(2021),
PARTNERS
HEALTH
Cost of Care and Treatment Decisions, AXENE
https:/ /axenehp.com/paying-healthcare-providers-impact-provider-reimbursementoverall-cost-care-treatment-decisions/.
196

Id.

197 Jacqueline LaPointe, Healthcare M&A Leads to 90% of Markets Being Highly Consolidated,
REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 8, 2018), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/healthcarema-leads-to-90-of-markets-being-highly-consolidated.
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acquisition trend. 198 And indeed, it is highly difficult to enter this
market as a new competitor due to substantial regulatory
challenges. 199 For both diagnostic medical devices and implantable or
affixed medical devices, the possibility of a legitimate "alternative
choice" may not be available at all.
Patients are last in line regarding healthcare choices far before they
must make a decision about whether they agree with any one of these
organizations 'privacy policies. Insurers, which are available because
an employer or the government has provided limited options, have
relationships with a limited number of healthcare providers, which
treat patients knowing that some medical products will not be
reimbursed or may only be partially reimbursed. And few products
may even be available for free or low cost to a patient of that type and
with that diagnosis. In some cases, a patient will be left with only one
option. In each and every step, patients have very little control over
choices made about them, especially regarding privacy interests.
2.

Voluntariness and Coercion in Healthcare Personal Information
(and Protected Health Information) Use

The complexity of healthcare transactions influences how much
choice a patient has, including how their personal information (or
Protected Health Information (PHI)) will be used. Patients must
provide personal information or PHI to all of these organizationsinsurer, healthcare provider, medical device manufacturer (when a
device is used) to receive and pay for healthcare. In the beginning of
these relationships and ongoing upon material change, an insurance
provider or health plan, healthcare provider, and, sometimes, medical
device manufacturers, display privacy notices to patients. 200 These
notices (unsurprisingly) are contracts of adhesion, too, as each
organization's notice of privacy practices and authorization

198 Andy Dixon & Tyler Bradshaw, Fast Forward: Consolidation Continues in Medical Device

2018),
(Mar.
HARRISWILLIAMS
Manufacturing,
Contract
https:/ /www.harriswilliams.com/article/fast-forward-consolidation-continues-medicaldevice-contract-manufacturing.
199 Matthew Grennan & Robert Town, Is the FDA Too Tough on Medical Device Makers?

KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(June
25,
2015),
https:/ /knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-just-right-zone-for-medical-deviceregulation/.
200 45 C.F.R.

§ 164.520.
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documents are identical (with respect to all similarly situated persons)
and non-negotiable. 201
Contracts of adhesion are an accepted form of consumer
contracting used heavily in healthcare transactions, even though "take
it or leave it" contractual terms are inherently coercive. 202 The main
difference between healthcare and other consumer contracts is that the
stakes are usually much higher. For example, under typical consumer
circumstances, if a consumer does not like a privacy notice for a
connected home thermostat system, the consumer could select a
different product. 203 But in healthcare, the likelihood of a patient
seeking care from another healthcare provider organization or
selecting an alternative health technology due to unfavorable privacy
terms in a contract of adhesion is extremely low.
In the case of prescribed medical devices, a patient is not usually
in a position to refuse a device recommended by the patient's
physician based on data practices: in part, because of the unavailability
of this information to the physician, but mostly because the patient is
in a position of trust and need. The alternative choice may be a choice
that dramatically reduces the overall safety or efficacy of diagnosis or
treatment or simply is not reimbursable.
Finally, there is the issue of ranked preferences: when a patient
selects a medical device or an Al procedure, the patient likely ranks
their safety or the technology's efficacy, such as reduction in recovery
time, minimally invasive procedure, results accuracy, or even usability
higher than comparatively more abstract data protection concerns. 204
The patient also likely selects the device that does not cost them
significant out-of-pocket expenses. These ranked preferences should
201 Tschider, supra note 108, at 1519-20.
202 Nora K. Duncan, Adhesion Contracts:A Twentieth Century Problem for a Nineteenth Century

Code, 34 LA. L. REV. 1081 (1974).
203 Id. at 1521. It should be noted that in most consumer transactions, coercive practices are used
to obtain personal information. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 107, at 1488-89.

Strombom, Improving Health Care by
Understanding PatientPreferences, 5 J. AM. MED. INFO. Ass'N. 257, 259 (1998) ("While the value
of understanding and using patient preferences in health care is well recognized, its
implementation presents a daunting challenge to clinicians and patients alike. To imagine
what a future state of health might be like and to determine the desirability of that future
state are complex cognitive tasks. In addition, many patients lack experience in thinking
about abstract concepts such as values and preferences. Attempting to do so under the
stressful circumstance of the clinical encounter taxes the patient to an even greater degree.").

204 See generally Patricia Flatley Brennan & Indiana
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not necessarily lead us to believe that privacy is not important to
patients, but rather signal that a patient is not in the kind of position to
safeguard their own interests via private contracting. Simply,
immediate salient concerns will present as more important, which may
constitute a higher likelihood of coercion regarding more abstract or
long-term concerns, such as privacy. 205
3. AI Technology Provider Issues
Structural, cognition, and exogeneity issues are well-known for
nearly all consumer devices. The sheer volume of available privacy
notices and subsequent consent to these notices makes it nearly
impossible for consumers to read them all: one study recorded the time
to review every notice presented at 76 working days a year. 206
Cognition issues are related not only to whether or not notices are
written in plain language but also due to the difficulty of individually
assessing risk related to data collection, use, and retention. 207
Risk is similarly complicated due to exogenous risk factors, which
are only exacerbated in AI infrastructures. 208 A primary entity, like a
hospital or clinic, will usually engage third parties to provide an AI
solution, which means the primary entity that maintains a relationship
with the patient will not usually completely understand how data are
used within the solution. 209

205 Id.
206 See Tschider, supra note 108, at 1522; Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You

Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 Work Days, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/re ading-the-privacy-policiescc/93FW[https://perma.
you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/

EEPA].
207 Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1880,1885 (2013) ("There is a more difficult problem with proposals for improved notice
. .. [s]uch proposals neglect a fundamental dilemma of notice: making it simple and easy to
understand conflicts with fully informing people about the consequences of giving up data,
which are quite complex if explained in sufficient detail to be meaningful. People need a
deeper understanding and background to make informed choices, [but] many privacy notices
. . . are vague about future uses of data.").
208 See Tschider, supra note 142, at 1524 (describing the inability of an individual person to

approximate potential risks involving third party activities and contracts that govern third
party relationships with a primary entity with whom a patient might do business).
209 Although the healthcare provider will be considered a covered entity under HIPAA or a
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parties
depend
on third
AI solutions
Additionally,
(subcontractors), such as big data cloud providers or other
infrastructure service providers to make decisions regarding these
data. 210 Typically, hospital entities form contracts with AI solutions,
which in turn contract with subcontractors, which contract with other
subcontractors, which may or may not be regulated under any U.S.
law. 211 The exogeneity of these practices dramatically affects patient
privacy risk.212 See Figure 3 for an example of third-party complexity.

Figure 3: Third-Party Relationships
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as a Serice Provider

As you can see in Figure 3, which is a highly simplified map of
third-party relationships, from the perspective of the patient,
describing third parties who may be involved in data handling
practices may be tremendously difficult. In fact, the Notice of Privacy
primary entity from the perspective of the FTC and the CCPA, they also have comparatively
less information with regards to how the system actually works, despite being responsible
(typically) for providing a privacy notice. It should be noted that some Al providers may be
coextensively considered covered entities under HIPAA, yet lack the direct relationship with
the patient to adequately inform about potential risks.
210 See Tschider, supra note 2, at 2.
211 HIPAA addresses this concern through the Business Associate Agreement (BAA), which
essentially exports HIPAA requirements via contractual terms. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(2).
212 See Tschider, supra note 142, at 1524-25.
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Practices under HIPAA, the privacy notice under the Fair Information
Practices, and a privacy notice under CCPA do not require disclosure
of the actual names of third parties or their specific roles.213 These laws
only require a description of the types of third parties involved.
A HIPAA authorization may disclose the identity of the third
party, but it also does not provide details of the third party's programs
or provide sufficient information for even a sophisticated patient to
adequately assess potential risk to their PHI.214 Notably, the Fair
Information Practices and the CCPA do not require any additional
detail be provided for secondary use. The depth and relative opacity
of subcontracting relationships, including details about their
respective privacy and security programs, contractual obligations, and
other data uses makes adequately transparent disclosure of primary
and third-party data handling practices nearly impossible.
4. Temporality and Prior Notice
Finally, consent suffers from temporality concerns. The concept of
notice and consent is premised on a legitimate and logical model that
if a patient consents to data practices after being notified of them, this
will mean that they have weighed their risks prior to making a
decision. 215 For simple data uses with non-complex or no third-party
relationships, the concept of prior notice coupled with consent works
reasonably well to notify a patient of potential risks and for that patient
to decide whether or not to proceed.
However, AI manufacturers, even for locked Al where clinical
trials feed the creation of an initial algorithm, may not know which
data are most useful.216 And practically speaking, an Al manufacturer
generally does not have any direct relationship or opportunity to

213 45 C.F.R.

214 45 C.F.R.

§ 164.520(b);
§ 164.512.

see FTC PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 116.

215 See Solove, supra note 208, at 1880 (defining "privacy self-management" as a "bundle of rights
[that] .. . provide[s] people with control over their personal data [resulting in people deciding
for themselves] how to weigh the costs and benefits of the collection, use, or disclosure of
their information").
216 See Tschider, supra note 142, at 1527.
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For example, a system could collect medical record data other than
data related to the specific Al that becomes incredibly important to the
algorithm's function at a later time but does this through a
combination of indirectly collected data from healthcare providers as
well as from other sources. However, it may not be possible to
accurately describe to patients why this individually identifiable
information or PHI is being collected prior to collecting the data or
even have an interface to do so.
Notice and consent exacerbates these key disclosure issues
because it positions consent as "choice" when unencumbered choice is
not possible. The reliance on notice and choice procedure as a stand-in
for unencumbered choice misleads patients through a false sense of
security. AI systems typify the very conditions for choice
imperfections.

B. Data Minimization and Identifiability
Most algorithmic development efforts depend on access to data. 218
Data sets used to train algorithms for a diagnostic result may be reused
to train algorithms for another diagnostic result. 219 For example, heart

217 It may be possible for a manufacturer to post a privacy notice on their website for a particular

device type, and indeed this activity is mandated by California, even prior to the passage of

the CCPA.
218 Indeed, data are essential to the development of Al. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai,

ClearingOpacity Through Machine Learning, 106 IowA L. REv. 775,800-01 (2021).
219 Diagnostic and kinetic Al products may use clinical data to tune these systems. However,
most systems benefit from ongoing or transferred data use. For purposes of this article, we
are focusing on data collected in a commercial setting, rather than clinical data. However,
clinical data sharing and reuse is a common issue in the development phase for many
technologies and, indeed, data use restrictions in contract and law can create significant issues
for data availability for these purposes. See, e.g. Michael Mattioli, The Data-PoolingProblem, 32

(2017),
200-01
179,
J.
L.
TECH.
https://btlj.org/data/articles20l7/vol32/32_1/MATTIOLI_web.pdf (describing challenges
BERK.

related to restrictions in data sharing and availability for cancer research, including
professional, competitive, and reputational concerns by Principal Investigators, rather than
concerns over privacy). Governments like the U.S. have tried to address this with data and
scholarly deposit contractual obligations, but it does not seem to have changed the research
world dramatically. Charlotte Tschider, Innovation in the Public Sphere: Reimagining Law and

Economics to Solve the National Institutes of Health Publishing Controversy, 1
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conditions may be diagnosed using similar data. An electrocardigram
(ECG) machine is used to diagnose arrythmia, coronary artery disease,
congenital heart defects, enlarged heart, pacemaker efficacy, or heart
failure. 220 It is not hard to imagine, then, that data collected using an
ECG or similar machine could be reused to develop new and different
algorithms. Similarly, conditions like Alzheimer's or Parkinson's
Disease, which manifest in various physical symptoms, could be
diagnosed using data related to ambulation, neurological testing, brain
imaging, and muscular performance. Without quality data, Al
algorithms are less effective. Without data, Al algorithms cannot be
created at all; for Al, all in-scope data needed to develop, train, or
improve Al are necessary.
1. Data Minimization
It is well-known that AI's success is based on access to large,
accurate, and well-labeled data stores, or data maximization. But part
of AI's unique value proposition is to render personalized medicine to
patients by increasing safe, effective, and fair services specific to the
individual. 221 Precision medicine requires vast access to diverse and
identifiable data elements, in particular electronic health records, so
that Al systems can work most effectively. According to a recent
study," [t]o implement effective personalized and population health
with enhanced ability to positively impact patient outcomes, it is
important to harness the power of electronic health records (EHR) by
integrating disparate data sources and discovering patient-specific
patterns of disease progression to provide real-time decision
support." 222 The researchers went on to describe how the Al algorithm
relied on data and infrastructure to create multiple applications:

(2014), https://academic.oup.com/jlb/issue/1/3 (describing the substantial financial
impacts through lack of data and scholarly sharing for publicly funded research, despite
contractual obligations to deposit these details in publicly available databases as a condition
for funding).
220 Electrocardiogram (ECG or EKG),

MAYO CUNIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/ekg/about/pac-20384983 (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).

221 See Tschider, supra note 2, at 708.

21 Zeeshan Ahmed et al., Artificial Intelligence with Multi-functional Machine Learning Platform

Development for Better Healthcare and PrecisionMedicine, DATABASE (OXFORD) 1, 2-4 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7078068/.
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implementation
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increased data flow that allows machines to self-develop a complex
function with improved predictability, as long as a large amount of data
is fed as input. They developed a deep convoluted neural network for
skin cancer detection, image analysis for diabetic retinopathy
evaluation, smartphone-based AI platform to measure adherence in
patients on direct oral
reduction.

anticoagulants and patient's visit length

The concept of personalization is directly related to big data
volumes to train, for example, Al machine learning classifiers. These
classifiers, through data analysis, create the appropriate weightings
and relationships necessary for AI functionality. 224
Personalized medicine, by its very definition, requires some
personalization, which requires access to identifiable data for a portion
of the Al lifecycle: during algorithmic training and clinical trials, as
well as when an individual patient "uses" the AI.225 Although some Al
used to aid in healthcare efficiency goals, accountable care strategies,
or quality goals may be effectively de-identified, 226 personalization
complicates the degree to which de-identification is possible or
desirable.
2.

Data De-Identification

As an affordance HIPAA and the CCPA offer, it is tempting to
believe that organizations could render all data de-identified to simply
avoid privacy obligations and reduce privacy risk to patients.
However, the concept of de-identification, or removing data elements

223 Id.
224 Id. at 4.
225 Clinical trials are typically subject to the Common Rule, which offers considerably more
flexibility in establishing de-identification, as detailed in guidance from the Office of Human
Research Protections (OHRP). Data are not "individually identifiable when they cannot be
linked to specific individuals by the investigator(s) either directly or through coding
systems." Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to ProtectHealth Privacy in Research?

10 AM. J. BIOETH. 1, 3 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3032399/.
This model seems to open the door for pseudonymity, or individually identifiable
information coded where re-identification is possible, just not to individuals leading a study.
Despite this, data use after clinical trials by, for example, medical device or pharmaceutical
companies, generally will be subject to HIPAA restrictions.
226 Glenn Laffel, Using De-Identified Health Information to Improve Care: What, How and Why,
PRACTICE FUSION (Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.practicefusion.com/blog/using-deidentified-patient-data-to/.
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to render a data set either non-identifiable or at low risk of reidentification, 227 is complicated by AI's big data stores. 228 HHS 'Safe
Harbor enables organizations to remove 18 identifiers from a data set
to accomplish Safe Harbor status in use, transfer, or even sales. 229
Although the CCPA does not offer any specificity like HHS 'Safe
Harbor, risk of reidentification may be difficult to demonstrate absent
expert determination.
As a voracious consumer of data, Al has the potential to render a
patient identifiable using a quantum of "de-identified" data
elements. 230 For example, a patient's age, general location, location of
treatment (but not treatment date), disease, complications, and social
media connections could create a high probability of reidentification
despite being de-identified according to HIPAA's Safe Harbor,
especially when combined with public data or additional data
sources. 231 For data like genetic information, which is increasingly
used in Al diagnostics, de-identification may not even be possible. 232
Al exacerbates existing de-identification limitations for three
reasons: 1) Al is dependent on large and diverse (and often
identifiable) data sets, and usually it is unknown at the time of
collection which data are useful, 2) data sets are usually expanded
using collected or purchased data sets from other organizations, such
as insurers or other vertically integrated organizations, and 3) Al
algorithms are often used specifically to reidentify individual patients
from de-identified data.

227 De-identification is distinct from anonymization, which typically requires more removal of

identifiable data than the 18 identifiers required under HIPAA's De-identification Safe

Harbor.
228 See Tschider, supra note 1, at 104-109.

229 Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance

with the HealthInsurance Portabilityand Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DEPT. OF
2015), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for(Nov. 6,
SERVS.
& HUMAN
HEALTH
professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html.
230 Adam H. Greene, More DataPlease! The Challenges of Applying Health Information PrivacyLaws

to the Development of Artificial Intelligence, PRIVACY & SEc. L. BLoG (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy - security-law-blog/2020/02/ai-healthcare-privacy-

laws.
231 M6lanieBourassa Forcier et al., IntegratingArtificial Intelligence into Health Care through Data
Access: Can the GDPR Act as a Beacon for Policymakers? 6

https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/6//317/5570026.
232 Id.

J.

L. & BioSCi. 317 (2019),
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Contextualizing Data Minimization and De-Identification

3.

The context of data use in Al healthcare scenarios means applying
different conceptions of "reasonableness" with respect to data
minimization and de-identification. Contextual privacy, as extensively
explained by Helen Nissenbaum, involves information flow informed
by normative constructs. 233 These norms are informed by information
we know about the data subject, sender, recipient, information type,
and method of transmission. 234 For example, contextual privacy might
demand a different approach to privacy for an AI-enabled pacemaker
than for someone using Facebook.
Within diverse healthcare environments, situational contexts are
markedly different. For example, a diagnostic tool may not require
retention of individually identifiable data or PHI after diagnostic tool
use. Unsupervised machine learning algorithms and neural networks,
however, may require continuous data feeding for long-term learning,
and previously identifiable data may still be useful in de-identified
form after diagnosis.
For Internet of Health Things leveraging Al infrastructure, such as
a pacemaker or insulin pump, access and use of identifiable data may
be strictly necessary to ensure effective personalization of an Al
service. After service is cancelled, such identifiable data may be easily
de-identified. In both contexts, the appropriatebalance of use and deidentification may differ based on what conforms to HIPAA's
minimum necessary rule.
Healthcare AI creates challenges for longstanding privacy
constructs. To prioritize the patient's interests, including interests in
safe, effective, and fair Al, privacy law must adapt to more flexible,
context-based privacy that eschews insufficient procedural proxies for
real choice and one-size-fits-all approaches to collection, use, retention,
and de-identification.

233 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF
SOCIAL LIFE 4 (Stanford Univ. Press 2010).
234

Id.
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IV. RECOGNIZING LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN

Al SAFETY AND

PATIENT PRIVACY

The competing interests of Al safety and patient privacy
necessitate an interpretation of privacy law that accounts for differing
contexts. Re-conceptualizing notice and consent, data minimization,
and de-identification will simultaneously improve the effectiveness of
existing privacy requirements while permitting more expansive use
when such uses primarily benefit patients. The concept of legitimate
interest balancing, long-contemplated in the European Union but not
well-defined, offers a useful contextual lens to establish privacy
models at the federal and state level.
Although the Article 29 Working Party addressed legitimate
interests as a lawful basis for processing data as early as 2014,235 the
European Union's 2018 omnibus privacy regulation, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), enhanced the concept of legitimate
interest as a legal alternative to explicit consent.236 Legitimate interest
assessments typically involve evaluating specific benefits to individual
persons (such as patients in the healthcare context) and to the
organization, then weighing these benefits against one another:
1. Identify a legitimate interest
2. Show that the processing is necessary to achieve it; and
3. Balance it against the individual's interests, rights and
freedoms 237

Weighing these benefits in favor of individual people discourages
disproportionate behavior leading to commoditization of patients and
their data. Organizations should weigh these benefits at various times
in the data lifecycle, ensuring weightings continue to primarily benefit
human beings rather than organizations.
235 Working Party 844/142014

O.J.

(L 217) (EC).

236 Regulations 2016/679, Art. 6 1(f) Recital 47 2016

O. J.

(L 119) (EU). It should be noted that

legitimate interest is only available as a lawful basis for processing personal information
when benefits to the individual outweigh benefits to the organization. However, legitimate
interest is not "read" into any other requirements, notably when consent is used. This
potentially leaves the GDPR model open to the same consent issues U.S. privacy law faces. I
position legitimate interest as a coextensive requirement intended to bolster ethical privacy
practices and avoid consent abuses.
237 Legitimate Interests, INFO. COMM'R'S OFF.,

https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-

data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-forprocessing/legitimate-interests/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
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Despite the language itself not being explicitly mentioned in
HIPAA, the Fair Information Practices, or the CCPA, legitimate
interest analysis offers a unique lens for evaluating the laws 'privacy
features. As a core aspect of legitimate interest analysis, organizations
must evaluate whether individually identifiable data or PHI are truly
necessary for purposes of benefitting the patient.238 For example,
legitimate interest is often described as "interest balancing," or analysis
of the relative data use benefits to an organization or a patient. 239 See
Figure 4 for an example of the types of interests that may be balanced
in this analysis.

Figure 4: Legitimate Interest Balancing
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Interest balancing has the potential to offer important nuances in
how, and to what extent data collection and use takes place in
challenging areas of existing privacy models.

238 See DATA PROTECTION NETWORK, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF LEGm MATE INTERESTS UNDER THE
14
(2017),
1.0
VERSION
REGULATION
PROTECTION
DATA
GENERAL
EU

https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource-center/DPN-Guidance-A4-Publicaion.pdf.
239

Id. at 3.
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A. Minimum Necessary Data
One initial benefit to legitimate interest balancing is how it can
inform organizational conceptions of minimum necessary. Although
minimum necessary does not explicitly apply in the Fair Information
Practices and the CCPA, it is an important construct of some global
privacy laws that addresses individual patient risks through limiting
overcollection, use, and retention of such data. 240 For this reason,
privacy laws should include a minimum necessary requirement,
informed by legitimate interest balancing analysis.
Minimum necessary requirements, as informed by legitimate
interest balancing, should extend throughout the organization-patient
relationship, including to third parties and to the entire information
management lifecycle. For example, organizations and their third
parties should not be able to retain identifiable data longer than is
necessary to satisfy the interests of the patient, the patient's group (e.g.
individuals with congenital heart failure), or for substantial public
benefit. Additional limitations on third-party data use will likely apply
under traditional data use agreements included in these contracts.
Minimum necessary inherently has some contours of contextual
privacy: some Al technologies necessitate greater data collection for
safety, efficacy, and fairness purposes, but these data are essential to
fulfill patient interests. Indeed, necessity does not necessarily reflect a
limited quantum of data: some applications may require more than
others. By exclusively including a minimum necessary requirement for
these privacy models, organizations must truly consider both their
data needs and the interests of the patients they serve. It also means
that primary entities need to better understand their third-party
relationships and ensure that third-party behavior is consistent with
patient interests.
B. Data De-Identification
Data de-identification can also be positioned as an overt
requirement related to data minimization. As a practical matter, data
may still be useful but do not need to be as identifiable over time, as
data exhibit a particular lifecycle. This means that first, we may need

240 CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER, INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECJRITY AND PRIVACY LAW IN PRACTICE 12-

13 (Wolters Kluwer 2018).
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to reconceptualize de-identification as a range of identifiability rather
than a false dichotomy.
Data de-identification for Al may not ever be fully achievable.
Indeed, as the data set grows, de-identification while retaining data
usefulness becomes less likely. However, organizations can both retain
usefulness and reduce risk to individuals by removing data elements
or portions of data elements that are not necessary to collect, use, or
retain. This means that all activities related to data collection, use, and
retention will remain identifiable, albeit less identifiable. This means
that organizations must still comply with privacy laws like HIPAA,
the FTC Act, and the CCPA, and an "easy out" of the statute would no
longer exist.
While this might appear overly restrictive on the surface,
legitimate interest analysis could offer additional flexibility based on
how identifiable the data are. For example, when it is necessary to
retain some identifiable data, an organization may pursue expert
determination or alternative privacy enhancing technologies to
demonstrate low risk to a patient.241 When there is low risk to a patient,
privacy laws could permit more flexible use and data sharing for
purposes that benefit the patient following legitimate interest analysis.
Implementing an alternative model like this will benefit
organizations in potentially making data more available and open, but
it also requires organizations to think more strategically about which
data to collect or retain, and when such data should be securely
deleted. Therefore, organizations aiming to extensively work with big
data implementation will need to develop extensive data lifecycle
management strategies that consider the relative costs and benefits to
individual patients and to themselves.
C. Notice and Consent
The most commonly used privacy notice in healthcare is the
Notice of Privacy Practices, or a privacy notice under the Fair
Information Practices and CCPA.242 The HIPAA Notice of Privacy
241 Cem Dilmegani, Top 10 PrivacyEnhancing Technologies (PETs) & Use Cases, Al MULTIPLE (July
JULES
https://research.aimultiple.com/privacy-enhancing-technologies/;
21,
2020),
POLONETSKY & ELIZABETH RENIERIs, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY 2020

10

RISKS AND 10 PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES TO WATCH IN THE NEXT DECADE

Uan.

https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/FPF_Privacy220_WhitePaper.pdf.
242 CAL. CIv. CODE

§ 1789.100; see FTC PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 116.

PRIVACY

2020),

182

HOUs. J. HEALTH L. & POLY

Practices at the federal level does not require consent, and neither do
the Fair Information Practices or CCPA. 243 Despite issues with consent
specifically, privacy notices perform a functional role in restricting, to
some degree, what an organization may do by binding them to their
disclosed purposes for collection.
Most organizations, however, do not disclose when data may be
collected for purposes of AI use. Although this does not perform a
curative role for patients to enforce their interests, it does enable
patients to be aware of Al use and for external parties to hold
organizations accountable. Therefore, if organizations intend to
engage in Al activities of any kind, including analyzing data for
internal operational purposes, to assist in diagnostic or treatment
decisions, or when prescribing an Al medical device or using physical,
tangible Al machines, the organization should at least disclose that Al
systems are used and generally for what purposes.
This approach notifies the patient of Al use, which, for those who
are interested in learning more, may prompt a patient to ask more
questions of their physicians or to follow-up with the organization. 244
For HIPAA specifically, AI, as described in Part I, could potentially be
considered by HHS as part of healthcare treatment, payment, or
healthcare operations, which eliminates the need for additional
authorizations under some circumstances.
This does not necessarily mean that all Al uses would or should
be included in the Notice of Privacy Practices. Reliance on third parties
to develop these products and potentially analyze or host data could,
however, cut in favor of facilitating authorization. HHS has an
opportunity to define how will be used to automate and aggregate
operational data, to assist in diagnosis or treatment, or to assist the
functioning of a human body as primarily within the scope of
treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.
An interest-balancing approach undergirds all decisions made
regarding data collection and use, and ultimately should be positioned
NOT as an alternative to consent, but rather as a separate and
243 Id.

244 It should be noted that although not specified here, the physician may be under an obligation
related to informed consent to medical procedures, or may be encouraged due to the potential
for a malpractice suit, to disclose when Al are used in health diagnosis or treatment, as well.
Despite imperfections in the nature of consent to privacy notices generally, notice, if not
overly complex, may at least prompt further discussion.

CHARLOTTE A. TSCHIDER

183

coextensive requirement to other privacy obligations. The cumulative
effect of legitimate interest analysis across data uses means that more
responsibility rests on the shoulders of organizations collecting data,
rather than expecting patients to understand and advocate for their
own interests.
It also means that data may be used more flexibly, so long as such
uses are consistent with general Al functionality and benefit the
patient. For example, benefits may be ranked from most personalized
to least: improving the very product the patient uses or was used for
the patient (highest weighting), improving product offerings for a
class of patients (mid-level weighting), such as patients with Type-1
Diabetes, or generally improving products overall for patients (lowerlevel weighting).
The Data Protection Network also provides some useful direction
for analyzing legitimate interests through the data use lifecycle:
(a) any link between the original purpose and the intended future
processing
(b) the context in which the Personal Data was collected; specifically, the
relationship between the Controller and the individual
(c) the nature of the Personal Data
(d) the possible consequences of the change of purpose on individuals

(e)

the existence of appropriate safeguards,

pseudonymization

245

e.g. encryption or

The cumulative result of patient benefits could be directly
compared against organizational benefits, and associated legitimate
interest assessment records could be retained by the organization at
their discretion in the event an investigation results.

CONCLUSION

This new model centralizes the role of legitimate interest analysis
as a key patient risk balancing lens for evaluating data collection, use,
retention, and identifiability. It also provides the opportunity to relax

245 See DATA PROTECTION NETWORK, supra note 238, at 77. Of special note, this approach to
evaluating legitimate interest takes into account privacy context.
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certain procedural privacy functions that either do not add much value
or, worse yet, mislead patients into a false sense of security.
It is tempting to consider rewriting these laws to establish greater
restrictions and manifest more comprehensive disclosures to enhance
patient choice. Unfortunately, the nature of modern healthcare simply
does not provide the scaffolding to animate meaningful choice.
Moreover, issues with existing privacy models are not cured by
doubling down on ineffective models that restrict access to crucially
important data. By integrating the legitimate interest concept into data
minimization, identifiability, and notice, privacy laws will consistently
enable organizations to create world-class products while protecting
patients. Through appropriate data use and reuse, both patients and
organizations legitimately stand to benefit.
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